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REPRESENTING ACTIONS IN LOGIC 
PROGRAMS AND DEFAULT THEORIES 
A S ITUAT ION CALCULUS APPROACH 
HUDSON TURNER 
t> We address the problem of representing common sense knowledge about 
action domains in the formalisms of logic programming and default logic. 
We employ a methodology proposed by Gelfond and Lifschitz which 
involves first defining a high-level anguage for representing knowledge 
about actions, and then specifying a translation from the high-level action 
language into a general-purpose formalism, such as logic programming. 
Accordingly, we define a high-level action language ~¢~, and specify sound 
and complete translations of portions of sCcE into logic programming and 
default logic. The language d~ includes propositions that represent 
"static causal aws" of the following kind: a fluent formula ~0 can be made 
true by making a fluent formula ~b true (or, more precisely, ~ is caused 
whenever ~b is caused). Such propositions are more expressive than the 
state constraints traditionally used to represent background knowledge. 
Our translations of Jaec~ domain descriptions into logic programming and 
default logic are simple, in part because the noncontrapositive nature of 
causal laws is easily reflected in such rule-based formalisms. © Elsevier 
Science Inc., 1997 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we address the problem of representing common sense knowledge 
about action domains in the formalisms of logic programming and default logic. 
We employ a methodology proposed by Gelfond and Lifschitz [GL93] which 
involves first defining a high-level language for representing common sense knowl- 
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edge about actions, and then specifying a translation from the high-level action 
language into a general-purpose formalism, such as logic programming. The 
advantage of starting with a high-level action language is that it can utilize a 
restricted syntax and a relatively simple semantics which is nonetheless adequate to 
capture our common sense intuitions about the whole family of action domains 
expressible in the language. Moreover, given a suitable action language and a 
translation from that language into a general-purpose formalism, the correctness of 
our representations of knowledge about actions in the general-purpose formalism 
becomes a precise mathematical question, to be settled by proving the translation 
sound and complete. 
Accordingly, in this paper we define a high-level action language dg  ~, and 
specify sound and complete translations of portions of ~'~' into logic programming 
and default logic. 
The action language d~ is based closely upon the language 5~'~ of Giunchiglia, 
Kartha and Lifschitz [GKL95] and its predecessor 5~¢'~' 0 [KL94]. The language ~ 
improves on ~¢'2 by adopting the method for representing causal background 
knowledge that was introduced by McCain and Turner in [MT95b]. In 5~¢'~', 
background knowledge is represented in the form of state constraints, which have 
been traditionally used for this purpose. Recently, many authors have argued that 
state constraints are inadequate for representing background knowledge in action 
domains, because they do not adequately represent causal relations [Gefg0, Elk92, 
Bar95, Lin95, MT95b, Thi95]. Accordingly, dg  ~ includes propositions that express 
"static causal laws" of the following kind: if a fluent formula tb is caused to be 
true, then a fluent formula ~b is caused to be true. From such a causal law it 
follows that, in the action domain being described, one can make $ true by making 
th true. It also follows that in every possible state, ~ is true if ~b is. In [MT95b] we 
argued for the usefulness of such propositions, and showed that they are much 
more expressive than state constraints. 
The portion of the language d~ that we correctly embed in logic programming 
subsumes the action language oq¢ [GL93]. By way of comparison, the original 
translation in [GL93] of ~ into logic programming was partial--it was sound only 
for a restricted subset of the d domain descriptions--and incomplete. Later sound 
and complete translations of 5e' utilized extensions or variants of logic program- 
ming: abductive logic programming [DD93, Dun93], equational logic programming 
[Thi94], or disjunctive logic programming [Tur94]. For the portion of 5~'~ that 
corresponds to ~¢, we specify in this paper a translation i to logic programming 
that is arguably simpler than any of those previously published, and does not 
require abduction or disjunction. Furthermore, the portion of z~'~ that we embed 
in logic programming is considerably more expressive than 5,¢. 
We employ in this paper the answer set semantics for (nondisjunctive) logic 
programs with classical negation [GLgl]J From a declarative point of view, 
nondisjunctive logic programming under the answer set semantics is essentially a
special case of Reiter's default logic [Rei80]. In what follows, we will devote 
considerable attention to translations of d~ into the more expressive formalism of 
default logic. In fact, our translation into logic programming is, for the most part, 
simply a special case of this more general translation. 
1Recall (from [GL90]) that such programs are easily reducible to normal logic programs under the 
stable model semantics [GL88]. 
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In the default theories obtained by our translation from ~¢'~, every default rule 
is either "justification-free" or "normal." In this way our approach is simpler than 
that of Morris [Mor88], which uses non-normal defaults. Moreover, our method has 
the considerable advantage of guaranteeing correct representations of common 
sense knowledge for a wide variety of action domains. 
In Section 2 we illustrate the range of applicability of the definitions introduced 
in this paper, by considering four example action domains. We provide for each a 
brief informal description, a formalization in the action language ~¢~, and a 
corresponding formalization in logic programming, default logic, or both. After 
some preliminary definitions (Section 3), we define in Section 4 the high-level 
action language d~.  In Section 5 we specify a translation from a subset of ~¢'~ 
into default logic, and state the relevant soundness and completeness theorems. 
We also specify a second, simpler translation which is sound and complete for a 
smaller subset of ~ .  Section 5 also includes a comparison between the default 
theory we obtain for the classic Yale Shooting domain [HM87] and the default 
theories considered by Hanks and McDermott [HM87] and by Morris [Mor88]. In 
Section 6 we show that, under a simple syntactic restriction on the form of ~a~'g  
domain descriptions, the translations into default logic can be adapted to generate 
logic programs that correctly represent commonsense knowledge about actions. In 
Appendix A we present the Splitting Theorems for default logic from [Tur96b]. 
These are technical results of a general nature, which are used in proving the 
soundness and completeness of the translation from ~¢~ into default logic. We 
defer until Appendix B the proofs of theorems, most notably the proof of the 
correctness of the embedding of oC~ in default logic. 
2. FOUR EXAMPLES 
In order to illustrate the range of applicability of the definitions introduced in this 
paper, we next consider four example action domains, providing for each an 
informal description, a formalization in the high-level action language ~,  and a 
sound and complete translation into default logic, logic programming, or both. 
Example 1
We begin with yet another variant of the Yale Shooting domain [HM87]. There is a 
pilgrim and a turkey. The pilgrim has two guns. If the pilgrim fires a loaded gun, 
the turkey will be caused to be not alive in the resulting situation. Furthermore, 
one can make the turkey be not trotting by making it not alive, because any causal 
explanation for the turkey being not alive is also a causal explanation for the 
turkey not trotting. Initially the turkey is trotting and at least one of the two guns is 
loaded. 
Based on this informal description, we can conclude, for instance, that the 
turkey is not trotting in the situation that would result if the pilgrim were to shoot 
his two guns, one after the other, in the initial situation. 
This is an example of a "temporal projection" action domain, in which we are 
told only about the values of fluents in the initial situation. Furthermore, this is an 
"incomplete" temporal projection domain, since the information we are given 
about the initial situation does not completely describe it. 
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This action domain includes a "static causal law": whenever not alive is caused 
to be true, not trotting is also caused to be true. It follows from this static causal 
law that one can make the turkey be not trotting by making it be not alive. 
Therefore, shooting a loaded gun when the turkey is trotting has not only the 
"direct effect" of killing the turkey, but also the "indirect effect," or "ramification," 
of making it stop trotting. 
In the action language 5~'~, this action domain can be formalized as follows. 2 
initially Trotting 
initially Loaded(Gun 1) v Loaded( Gun 2) 
Alive suffices for ~ Trotting 
Shoot(x) causes ~ Alive if Loaded(x) 
This ~¢W domain description entails, for instance, the d~'  proposition 
Trotting after Shoot(Gun 1) ; Shoot( Gun 2) 
which says that --1 Trotting holds in the situation that would result from performing 
the action sequence Shoot(Gun 1); Shoot(Gun2) in the initial situation. 
The domain description includes the proposition 
Alive suffices for ~ Trotting 
which describes the static causal law: it says that, in the action domain we are 
describing, whenever -~ Alice is caused, -7 Trotting is also caused. Because of this 
static causal law, it is impossible in this action domain for trotting to be true when 
alive is false. Intuitively, this can be explained as follows. In every situation, (we 
require that) every fact is caused. In particular then, whenever alive is false in a 
situation, the fact that alive is false must be caused. And since not alive is caused, 
it follows by the static causal law that not trotting is also caused; and consequently 
not trotting must be true as well. Accordingly, the semantics of 5~'W guarantees 
that no model of the domain description includes a situation in which both Trotting 
and ~ Alive hold. On the other hand, we emphasize that in the semantics of 5~'~" it
does not follow from this proposition that Alive can be made true by making 
Trotting true! This failure of contraposition reflects the fact that one cannot make 
a turkey be alive just by making it trot. (On the contrary, common sense tells us 
that one simply cannot make a turkey trot unless it is alive.) 
The action domain in this example is correctly formalized by the default theory 
shown in Figure 1, which can be obtained from the above domain description by a 
translation defined in Section 5 of this paper. 
The first rule in this default theory reflects the assertion that the turkey is 
initially trotting, by ensuring that there can be no consistent extension of the 
default theory in which the turkey is initially not trotting. In a similar fashion, the 
second rule says that at least one of the pilgrim's guns is initially loaded. The form 
ZAlthough z~'W domain descriptions do not include variables, we sometimes u e meta-variables in 
our representations of them. For instance, the meta-variable x in the fourth expression i  the domain 
description ranges over {Gun 1, Gun2}. 
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-~ Holds( Trotting, So) -~( Holds( Loaded( Gun l ), So) V Holds(Loaded(Gun2), So)) 
False False 
-~Holds( Alive, s) Holds(Loaded(z), s) 
~Holds( Trottiug, s) ~noldsC Ati~e, R,s~tC Shoot(=), ,)) 
: Holds(f, So) : .Holds(/, So) 
Holds(f, So) -.Holds(f, So) 
Holds(f, s): Holds(f, Result(a, s) ) -~Holds( f ,s) : -~Holds(f, Result(a, s) ) 
Holds(f, Result(a, s) ) -.Holds(f, Result(a, s) ) 
FIGURE 1. Default heory for Example 1. 
of these two rules may be surprising. For instance, one may wonder why the the 
first rule is not simply 
True 
Holds( Trotting, S o) 
instead. This can be explained as follows. 
Consider the ~¢~" domain description obtained by deleting the first two proposi- 
tions from the above domain description. 
-~ Alive suffices for ~ Trotting 
Shoot(x) causes ~ Alive if Loaded(x). 
This reduced domain description has exactly twelve models, one for each possible 
initial situation. (Recall that the ~'~' proposition ~ Alive suffices for --1 Trotting 
rules out any situation in which Alive is false and Trotting is true.) In the semantics 
of ~¢~, the role of the proposition 
initially Trotting 
is simply to eliminate those models in which trotting is initially false. Similarly, the 
~¢~ proposition 
initially Loaded(Gun1) v Loaded(Gun2 ) 
simply eliminates those models in which both guns are initially unloaded. Thus the 
full domain description has exactly three models. 
Now, the translation into default logic has the property that there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between ~a:~' models of the domain description and consistent 
extensions of the corresponding default theory. Thus, the default theory for the 
reduced omain description has twelve consistent extensions. Adding the rule 
-~ Holds ( Trotting, S o) 
False 
simply eliminates those extensions that include the literal ~ Holds(Trotting, So). 
Similarly, adding the rule 
(Holds(Loaded(Gun1) , So) V Holds(Loaded(Gun2) , So) ) 
False 
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simply eliminates those extensions in which, roughly speaking, both guns are 
initially unloaded. Adding both of these rules eliminates nine extensions in all, and 
leaves us with exactly the three extensions that correspond to the three models of 
the original domain description. Because of the simple, monotonic behavior of 
such default rules, the correctness of this aspect of the translation is relatively 
transparent. 
The third rule in the default theory says that the turkey can be made to stop 
trotting by making it not alive. Notice that this default rule does not allow one to 
derive Holds(Alive, S o ) from Holds(Trotting, So), for instance. This reflects the fact 
that the static causal law is noncontrapositive. Nonetheless, in the context of the 
default theory as a whole, this default rule guarantees, for instance, that no 
consistent extension can include both Holds(Trotting, S o) and ~ Holds(Alive, So). 
The fourth rule in the default theory says that the turkey is not alive after the 
pilgrim fires a gun, if that gun is loaded. 3 Notice that this default rule does not 
allow one to derive the literal ~Holds(Loaded(Gunl),S o) from the literal 
Holds(Alive, Result(Shoot(Gun 1 ), So)) , for instance. This reflects the common sense 
intuition that facts in the future cannot "cause" facts in the past. 4 
The remaining rules in the default theory are standard elements of the transla- 
tion we are considering. The fifth and sixth rules reflect the obvious fact that each 
fluent is either true or false in the initial situation, by forcing each consistent 
extension of the default theory to include, for each fluent F, either the literal 
Holds(F, S o) or the literal ~ Holds(F, So). Furthermore, these two rules guarantee 
that the default theory takes into account every possible initial situation. The 
seventh and eighth rules express the "common sense law of inert ia"- - the principle 
that things don't change unless they are made to. For instance, since we have the 
literal Holds(Trotting, So) , one of the inertia rules allows us to derive the literal 
Holds(Trotting, Result(Shoot(Gun1), So)), so long as it is consistent to do so (which, 
roughly speaking, it will be if and only if the first gun is initially unloaded). Notice 
that these inertia rules again reflect the common sense belief that facts in the 
future do not "cause" facts in the past. 
This action domain can also be correctly formalized in logic programming, under 
the answer set semantics of Gelfond and Lifschitz [GL91]. Because of the well- 
known equivalence of logic programming under the answer set semantics and the 
appropriate subset of default logic [GL90], the logic program in Figure 2 can be 
understood as a direct translation of the previous default theory, except for the first 
and second rules, which are handled in a slightly more complex fashion (to the 
explained in Section 6 of this paper). 
Recall that one consequence of the action domain in this example is that the 
turkey would not be trotting if the pilgrim were to shoot his two guns, one after the 
other, in the initial situation. Accordingly, the literal 
-7 Holds ( Trotting, Result (Shoot( Gun 2 ), Result (Shoot( Gun 1 ), S O ))) 
is a consequence of both the default theory and the logic program. 
3Here, as earlier, x appears as a meta-variable ranging over {Gunl,Gun2}. 
4This point is discussed further in Section 5.2, where we briefly compare our translation to previous 
published proposals for representing actions in default logic [HM87, Mor88]. 
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i. False ,-- notHolds( ~rotting, So) 
2. False ,--- not Holds( Loaded( Gun x ), So), not Holds( Loaded ( Guna ), So) 
3. ",Holds( Trotting, s) ~ -~Holds( Aiive, s) 
4. ~Holds C a li~e, SesultC Shoot (=), s) ) . -  noldsC Zo=ded(=), s)
5. Holds(f, So) *-- not-~nolds(f, So) 
6..=Holds(f, So) *- not Holds(f , So) 
7. Holds(f, Result(a, s) ) *-- Holds(f, s), not.=Holds(f , Result(a, o)) 
8..=Holds(f, Result(a, s) ) 4-- .Holds(f  ,s), not Holds(f ,Result(a, s) ) 
FIGURE 2. Logic program for Example 1. 
Example  2 
Let us consider a second action domain, adapted from [Lin95], in which there is a 
spring-loaded briefcase with two clasps. We have actions that unfasten the clasps, 
one at a time. If both clasps are unfastened, the briefcase pops open. Initially the 
briefcase is not open. We can conclude in this case that the briefcase would be 
open after we unfastened the first clasp in the initial situation if and only if the 
second clasp is initially not fastened. 
As in the previous example, this is an incomplete temporal projection domain in 
which there is a static causal aw. Once again, we are interested in possible indirect 
effects, or ramification, of actions. 
This action domain can be formalized in ~¢~ by the following domain descrip- 
tion. 
initially ~ Open 
Unfasten(x) causes ~ Fastened(x) 
-~ Fastened(Clasp] ) A -~ Fastened(Clasp2) suffices for Open. 
The corresponding default theory appears in Figure 3. 
The first three rules of the default theory correspond to the three propositions 
in the domain description. The last four rules again encode the completeness of
the initial situation and the common sense law of inertia. (As in the previous 
example, this domain description can also be translated into a logic program.) 
The domain description entails the ~ '~ proposition 
(Open after Unfasten(Clasp1 )) =- (initially ~ Fastened(Clasp:)) 
and, accordingly, the formula 
Holds ( Open, Result (Unfasten ( Clasp1 ), S O )) =- -~ Holds ( Fastened( Clasp2 ), S O ) 
Holds(Open, So) ~,~,e 
False -.Holds(Fastened(z), Result(Unfasten(z), s)) 
.=Holds(Fastened(ClaJpl) , s) A ~Holds( Fo.stened( Cla~p=), s) 
Holds( Open, s) 
: Holds(f, so) : ~Holds(/, So) 
Holds(f, So) -.Holds(f, So) 
Holds(I, s) : Holds(y, Result(a, s)) -~Holdsff, s): -~Holds(/, nes,,U(a, s)) 
Holds(f, Result(a, s) ) "=Holds(f, Result(a, s) ) 
FIGURE 3. Default heory for Example 2. 
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is a consequence of the default theory. In contrast with the previous example, we 
are concerned in this case with a consequence of a more complex kind, relating 
fluent values at two different time points. 
Traditionally, background knowledge in action domains has been represented in
the form of state constraints, which are, intuitively speaking, formulas of classical 
logic that are said to hold in every possible state of the world. Thus, for example, 
one might write a state constraint 
always -7 Fastened( Clasp1 ) A -~ Fastened(Clasp2) ~ Open 
in place of the proposition 
-1 Fastened(Clasp1 ) A ~ Fastened(Clasp2 ) suffices for Open 
which represents a static causal law. In general, static causal laws are more 
expressive than state constraints, as shown in [MT95b]. In fact, state constraints, as 
they have been traditionally understood, constitute a simple special case of static 
causal laws. In Section 7 we will discuss these issues at some length in relation to 
this and other examples. 
Example 3 
A third action domain, loosely adapted from [KL94, GKL95], involves flipping a 
coin and betting on the outcome. 5 After each toss the coin either lies heads or it 
does not. (Roughly speaking, the outcome of the toss action is nondeterministic.) If 
you bet heads when the coin lies heads, you become a winner. I f  you bet heads 
when the coin does not lie heads, you cease being a winner. Now, suppose that you 
toss and bet heads, after which you are a winner. In this case we can conclude that 
the coin was heads after the toss. 
This is an action domain in which there is a "nondeterministic" action. Notice 
also that this is not a temporal projection domain, since we are told about the value 
of a fluent in a noninitial situation. In this case, we are interested in reasoning 
from a later to an earlier time. 
This action domain can be formalized in ~ '~ as follows 
Winner after Toss ;BetHeads 
Toss possibly changes Heads 
BetHeads causes Winner if Heads 
BetHeads causes ~ Winner if --n Heads. 
This domain description entails the d~ proposition 
Heads after Toss 
and, accordingly, the literal 
Holds(Heads, Result( Toss, S O ) ) 
is entailed by the corresponding logic program, listed in Figure 4. 
5This action domain also resembles Sandewall's "Russian Turkey Shoot" domain [San94]. 
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1. False ~ not Holds( Winner, Result( BetHeads, Result( Toss, So))) 
2. holds(Heads, ne,uU(Toss. ,)) . -  non-holds(Heads, ne,uU(To,,, )) 
a. -Hotds( ~teads, Re,~lt( Toss. ,)) . -  not Hotds( He~ds, Re,,at(To,,, )) 
4. ~totds( Wiuuer ,~e,ultC BetHe,ds, )) . -  ttotdsC R,  ads, ,) 
~. -mom(  wiu,~er , nesuU( VaHeads, )) . -  ~nom(  Heads, ) 
6. Hotds(L So) ,-- ,~ot 7Holds(.f, So) 
7. -~Holds( f , So) 4-- uot Hotds(f , So) 
8. Hotds(.f, Re,ult(a, )) *-- notds( L ,), uot-~Hotds(f , R,,uU(,~, )) 
9. -.Holds(f, Result(a, s) ) ~ -.Holds(f, s), uot Holds(f , Result(a, s) ) 
F IGURE 4. Logic program for Example 3. 
The first rule of this program corresponds to the first proposition in the domain 
description. The next two rules correspond to the second proposition in the domain 
description. The fourth and fifth rules correspond to the third and fourth proposi- 
tions in the domain description. Again, the last four rules encode the completeness 
of the initial situation and the common sense law of inertia. 
Example 4 
Finally, consider a fourth action domain, adapted from [KL94]. The door to your 
hotel room is closed. It can be opened by inserting the keycard, but that is not 
possible when you do not have the keycard. 
In ~¢~' we write 
initially -1 DoorOpen 
InsertCard causes DoorOpen 
impossible InsertCard if ~ HasCard. 
Since it is not known whether or not you initially have your keycard, this domain 
description does not entail the ~¢~ proposition 
DoorOpen after InsertCard, 
but it does entail the weaker J~¢'~ proposition 
(DoorOpen after InsertCard) = (initially HasCard). 
Accordingly, the corresponding logic program (Figure 5) does not entail the literal 
Holds( DoorOpen, Result( InsertCard, So) ), 
but each answer set for the program includes exactly one of the following two 
literals: 
Holds( DoorOpen, Result( InsertCard, S o) ), ~ Holds (nasCard, So). 
This domain description, unlike those considered in the previous examples, 
describes an "action precondition" for one of its actions: the action InsertCard can 
be performed only in situations where HasCard holds. Thus, for instance, the 
domain description fails to entail the proposition 
True after InsertCard 
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1. False *-- not-~Holds(DoorOpen, So)
2. Holds( OoorOpen, Result( lnsertCard, s) ) *-- Reaehable( flesult( lnsertCard, s) ) 
3. -~aeachabte( nes~U(1~oertCa,a, ,) ) ~ -~Uotds( HasC~,~, ,) 
4. aeachabte(,) ~- ~ot~Rea,habte(,) 
s. -aea~habt,( ne,~U(a, ,)) . -  ~ne,eh,bte(,)  
6. Holds(f, So) ,-- not .Holds( f , So) 
7. -~Xotds(f , So) ~- .o~ ZtoZds(f, So) 
8. Holds(f, Result(a, s) ) . -  HoZds(f , s), Reachabl~( Re.~(=, ~) ,.ot-.Holds(f , Re.=U(a, .) ) 
9. -~Hoids(f , R~s~U(~, ~) ) . -  -.~oZdsCf , ~), JZ~achabl~C ne,~U(~, ,)), ~o~ XtotdsCf , nes~U(., .)) 
FIGURE 5. Logic program for Example 4. 
which says, roughly speaking, that the action of inserting the keycard can be 
performed in the initial situation. 
The action language ~¢~ handles action preconditions in a flexible and robust 
manner. By contrast we note that the sole restriction placed in this paper on the 
~¢~ domain descriptions translated into default logic will be a requirement that 
action preconditions be expressed in a particular "explicit" form. The domain 
description above satisfies this requirement, and therefore we are able to formalize 
it in logic programming, as shown in Figure 5, using a translation defined in Section 
6 of this paper. 
The first three rules of this program correspond to the three propositions in the 
domain description. The translation in this case is complicated by the fact that in 
this action domain, unlike the domains considered previously, there is an action 
that is sometimes impossible to perform. This additional difficulty is accommodated 
in the translation through the use of an additional predicate Reachable, which says 
of a sequence of actions that it can be performed in the initial situation. For 
instance, the third rule says that if you are in a situation in which you do not have 
your keycard, there is no "reachable" situation that can result from inserting your 
keycard--since you in fact cannot insert it. Rule 2 says that if it is indeed possible 
to insert your keycard in the current situation, then the door will be open after you 
have done so. Rule 4 expresses the assumption that situations are reachable unless 
we say otherwise. This assumption is based on the more fundamental assumption 
in ~¢~ that actions are performable unless we say otherwise (either explicitly or 
implicitly). Rule 5 says that if a given situation is not reachable, then it does not 
have any reachable successors. Notice that in this translation the assumption of 
inertia (in the last two rules) is also predicated on reachability. 
3. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS 
Given a set U of propositional atoms (not including the special constants True and 
False), we denote by S¢(U) the language of propositional logic with exactly the 
atoms U u {True, False}. 6 For any literal L, let L denote the literal complementary 
6Thus, .~(~) consists of all formulas in which only the atoms True and False occur. 
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to L. For any set X of literals, let _~ = {L : L ~ X}. By Lit(U) we denote the set 
U u U of literals. 7 In this description we say nothing about the form of the atoms 
in U, but of course an important special case is when U is the set of all ground 
atoms of a many-sorted first-order language. 
We represent an interpretation of .~(U)  as a maximal consistent set of literals 
from Lit(U). We say that a set of formulas from 2(U)  is logically closed if it is 
closed under propositional logic [with respect o .~(U)]. Inference rules over _~(U) 
will be written as expressions of the form 
4, 
¢~' 
where ~b and qJ are formulas from _~(U). 
Let R be a set of inference rules, and let F be a set of formulas. We say that F 
is closed under R if for every rule --~b in R, if ~b belongs to F then $ does too. By 
¢/ 
Cnu(R) we denote the least logically closed set of formulas from -~(U) that is 
closed under R. We will often find it convenient to identify a formula q~ with the 
inference rule 
True 
Under this convention, Cnu(F) denotes the least logically closed set of formulas 
from .~(U)  that contains F. Similarly, Cnu(F u R) is the least logically closed set 
of formulas from ~(U)  that contains F and is also closed under R. We sometimes 
omit the subscript o Cn when there is no danger of confusion. 
A default rule over -~(U) is an expression of the form 
~'/31 . . . . .  /3. 
, (3 .1 )  
3/ 
where all of a,/31 . . . . .  /3,, 3/ are formulas from -~(U) (n > 0). Let r be a default 
rule of the form (3.1). We call a the prerequisite of r, and denote it by pre(r). We 
call the formulas /31 . . . .  ,/3, the justifications of r, and write just(r) to denote the 
set {/31 . . . .  ,/3,}. We call 3, the consequent of r, and denote it by cons(r). If just(r) 
is empty, we say r is justification-free. If r is justification-free, we often identify r 
with the corresponding inference rule -- .  I f  pre(r)= True we often omit it and 
3, 
:/31 . . . . .  /3n . 
write mstead. If just(r) = {cons(r)}, we say that r is normal. 
T 
A default heory over _~(U) is a set of default rules over Sa(U). Let D be a 
default theory over SP(U) and let E be a set of formulas from .~(U). We define 
the reduct of D by E, denoted by D E, as follows 
De={ pre(r) } 
cons (r----~ :r ~ D and for all/3 ~ just (r), ~ [3 ~ E . 
7Notice that Lit(U) is a proper subset of the set of literals from .~(U),  since Lit(U) does not 
include the literals in which the special atoms True and False occur. 
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We say that E is an extension of D if 
E=Cnu(  DE) .  
We say D is consistent if it has at least one consistent extension. We say that a 
formula is a consequence of D if it belongs to every extension of D. Default logic is 
due to Reiter [Rei80]. The definition of an extension given above follows [GLPT91], 
and is equivalent to Reiter's definition. 
For the purposes of this paper, a logic program rule over .ZT(U) is an expression 
of the form 
L o ~L  1 . . . . .  L m, notLm+ 1 . . . . .  notL  n (3.2) 
with 0 _< m _< n, where L o ~ L i t (U)  tA {False} and for all i (1 < i _< n), L i ~ Lit(U). 
A logic program over -~(U) is a set of logic program rules over .ZF(U). 
Under the answer set semantics of Gelfond and Lifschitz [GL90], logic program- 
ming corresponds to a subset of default logic. Because it is convenient for the 
purposes of this paper, we will define the notions of "answer sets" and "entailment" 
for logic programs indirectly, in terms of the related notions for default logic. 
For each logic program P there is a corresponding default heory dt(P),  defined 
as follows. For each rule r ~ P of form (3.2), dt(P)  includes the rule 
L 1 A .'. AL  m :Lm+a, . . . , L  n
Lo 
A subset X of Li t (U)  is an answer set for P if there is an extension E of dt(P)  
such that X = E n Lit(U). It follows that X is a consistent answer set for P if and 
only if Cn(X)  is a consistent extension of dt(P).  For any L ~ Lit(U),  we say that P 
entails L if L belongs to all answer sets for P. It follows that P entails L if and 
only if dt(P)  does. 
Although the definitions in this section are stated for the propositional case, 
they are taken, in the standard way, to apply naturally in the (quantifier-free) 
nonpropositional case as well, by taking each nonground expression to stand for all 
of its ground instances. 
4. THE ACTION LANGUAGE ~'~ 
In the high-level action language ~f~, a description of an action domain is a set of 
propositions of the following five kinds: 
1. value propositions, which restrict he values of fluents in situations that would 
result from the performance of sequences of actions; 
2. sufficiency propositions, which say that whenever the truth of one fluent 
formula is caused, the truth of a second fluent formula is also caused; 
3. effect propositions, which say that under certain conditions a fluent formula 
would be caused to hold as a result of the performance of an action; 
4. influence propositions, which say that under certain conditions the perfor- 
mance of an action would "nondeterministically" change the value of a 
fluent; 
5. executability propositions, which say that under certain conditions an action 
would be impossible to perform. 
After specifying the syntax and semantics of ~'~,  we will illustrate the defini- 
tions with an example. 
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4.1. Syntax of ~ 
We begin with two disjoint nonempty sets of symbols, a set F of fluent names and a 
set A of action names. We designate a subset F I of F as the frame ftuents and we 
call the members of F \ Ff the nonframe fluents. A fluent formula is a formula from 
2(F) .  A frame fluent formula is a formula from _~(Ff). 
An atomic value proposition is an expression of the form 
4) after A, 
where 4) is a fluent formula, and X is a string of action names. If A is the empty 
string, we may write instead 
initially 4). 
A value proposition is a propositional combination of atomic value propositions. 
A sufficiency proposition is an expression of the form 
4) suffices for 0, 
where 4) and 0 are fluent formulas. Sufficiency propositions represent static causal 
laws. Thus, such a proposition says that, in the action domain being described, 
whenever 4) is caused ~b is also. We write 
always 4, 
as an abbreviation for the proposition True suffices for 4) and we write 
never 4) 
as an abbreviation for the proposition 4) suffices for False. Given a nonframe 
fluent F, an expression of the form 
always F -= 4), 
where 4) is a frame fluent formula, is called an explicit definition of F. We require 
that d~ domain descriptions include an explicit definition of every nonframe 
fluent. 
An effect proposition is an expression of the form 
A causes 4) if ~b, 
where A is an action name, and 4) and ~b are fluent formulas. If ~b is the formula 
True, we may drop the if and simply write A causes 4). 
An influence proposition is an expression of the form 
A possibly changes F if ~b 
where A is an action name, F is a fluent name, and ~b is a fluent formula. If 0 is 
the formula True, we may drop the if and simply write A possibly changes F. 
An executability proposition is an expression of the form 
impossible A if ~b 
where A is an action name and ~b is a fluent formula. In the semantics of ~ such 
a proposition has the same meaning as the effect proposition A causes False if ~b, 
but the syntactic distinction becomes convenient in Sections 5 and 6 when 
we specify translations of ~ '~ domain descriptions into default logic and logic 
programming. 
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An ~ domain description is a set of ~¢'~ propositions that includes an explicit 
definition for each nonframe fluent. 
4.2. Semantics of eg~ 
Let D be an d~ domain description, with fluents F and frame fluents F s. A 
structure for D is a partial function from action strings to interpretations of .~(F), 
whose domain is nonempty and prefix-closed. 8 By Dom(q~) we denote the domain 
of a structure q~. Notice that for every structure q~, Dom(q t) includes the empty 
string (denoted by e). 
4, 
Let R be the set of inference rules - -  such that the sufficiency proposition 
4, suffices for ip 
is in D. An interpretation S of SF(F) is called a state if Cn(S) is closed under R. 
Let A be action name and S a state. We say that A is prohibited in S if there is 
an executability proposition 
impossible A if ~b 
in D such that S satisfies ~. Let E(A, S) be the set of all fluent formulas 4, for 
which there is an effect proposition 
A causes 4, if ~b 
inD such that S satisfies ~b. Similarly, let F(A, S) be the set of all fluent names F 
for which there is an influence proposition 
A possibly changes F if ~b 
in D such that S satisfies ~/,. A set E of fluent formulas is called an explicit effect of 
A in S if: 
1. A is not prohibited in S, and 
2. there is an interpretation I of S f (F(A,  S)) such that E = I U E(A, S). 
We say that a state S' may result from doingA in S if there is an explicit effect E of 
A in S such that 
Cn(S' )=Cn[(SNS'  NLit(Fz))UEUR]. 
This fixpoint definition guarantees that S' may result from doing A in S if and 
only if the value of every frame fluent in S' is caused--e i ther it held the same 
value in S and was not made to change, or its value was changed (directly or 
indirectly) by the action. Thus, this definition essentially captures the commonsense 
law of inertia, which is the assumption that things don't change unless they're made 
to. 9 Let Res(A, S) denote the set of states that may result from doing .4 in S. 
Given a structure qt, we say an atomic value proposition 4, after A is true 
in qz if ,~Dom(~)  and ~(X)  satisfies 4,. The general truth definition for 
value propositions is then given by the standard recursion over the propositional 
connectives. 
SA set ~ of strings is prefix-closed if, for every string cr ~ E, every prefix of ~r is also in ~. 
9See [MT95b] and [PT95] for further discussion related to this fixpoint definition. 
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A structure * for D is a model o lD  if it satisfies the following four conditions: 
1. * (e )  is a state. 
2. For all X~ Dom(*)  and all action names A, if Res(A ,* (A) )  is nonempty 
then A; A ~ Dora(*).  
3. For all A; A ~Dom(*) ,  * (X ;  A)  ~Res(A ,* ( .~) ) .  
4. Every value proposition in D is true in * .  
A value proposition is entailed by D if it is true in every model of D. 
4.3. An  Example  d~ Domain  Description 
As an example illustrating the use of the preceding definitions, consider the 
following d~ domain description D 1, in which Dead is the only nonframe fluent 
always Dead =- ~ Alive 
initially Walking 
Walking after Shoot 
-1 Alive suffices for ~ Walking 
Shoot causes Dead A ~ Loaded 
impossible Shoot if ~ Loaded. 
Notice that we are describing here a different shoot action than in Example 1 
(Section 2), where shooting was always possible. There, the direct effect ~ Alive of 
the shoot action had a "fluent precondition" Loaded. Here, Loaded becomes 
instead an action precondition of Shoot. 
Domain description D 1 has a unique model "1, as follows 
Dom ( '1 )  = { e, Shoot} 
"1(• )  = {Loaded, Alive, ~ Dead, Walking} 
"1(Shoot)  = { --1 Loaded, --7 Alive, Dead, ~ Walking}. 
It is easy to check, for instance, that the following value proposition is true in "1 
(initially Loaded) A (Dead A --1 Loaded after Shoot). 
To exercise the definitions, we will verify that *1 is the unique model of D 1. It 
is clear that *1 is a structure for D l, so we begin by showing that * l  is a model. 
First, we must check that * l (e )  is a state. We see that domain description D1 
includes the sufficiency propositions 
always Dead - ~ Alive 
and 
--n Alive suffices for --n Walking 
from which we obtain the associated set of inference rules 
True ~ Alive I 
R = Dead - ~ Al ive '  ~ i 'V~g )" 
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It follows that there are exactly six states in this action domain; they are the six 
interpretations of _oW(F) that satisfy the fluent formulas Dead =---1 Alive and 
Alive D -1 Walking. We see that ~ l (e )  is indeed one of these six states. 
Second, we must check that Res(Shoot, ~l(Shoot)) is empty. Since D 1 includes 
the executability proposition 
impossible Shoot if ~ Loaded 
we see that Shoot is prohibited in ~l(Shoot). Therefore there can be no explicit 
effect E of Shoot in ~l(Shoot), which shows that Res(Shoot, qtl(Shoot))= 0.  
Third, we must verify that ~l(Shoot) belongs to Res(Shoot,~l(e)). That is, we 
must show that ~x(Shoot) may result from doing Shoot in ~l(e) .  This requires that 
we check that 
Cn(Wl(Shoot) ) = Cn(( Xlrl( • ) (") XI'rl (Shoot )  0 .Z~(Ff)) to E tO R), 
where E is an explicit effect of Shoot in W~(e). We first observe that Shoot is not 
prohibited in WI(e). Since D 1 includes no influence propositions, we have 
F(Shoot, Wl(e)) = Q~. Thus the only interpretation of _W( F( Shoot, q~l(E))) is also O. 
Since D 1 includes the effect proposition 
Shoot causes Dead A ~ Loaded 
we have 
E( Shoot, "1(")  ) = { Dead A ~ Loaded}. 
Given these observations, we can conclude that the unique explicit effect E of 
Shoot in ~ l (e )  is {Dead/x ~ Loaded}. It remains to observe that ~ l (e )  67 ~l(Shoot) 
is empty, so ~l(e)(7 ~l(Shoot)N ~(Ff )  is also. Thus what we are to verify is that 
Cn ( ,1 (Shoot) = Cn ( { Dead A 7 Loaded} U R) 
which is clearly true. In fact, what we have shown is that 
Res (Shoot, ~l( e ) ) = ( ~1 (Shoot) } 
since ~i(Shoot) is the only state that satisfies Dead A ~ Loaded. 
Fourth, we must check that ~ satisfies the two value propositions in D 1, which 
it clearly does. 
So we have shown that W 1 is indeed a model of domain description D 1. Now let 
us verify that it is the only model. 
Assume that W is a model of D 1. By model condition 1 we know that ~(e)  is a 
state, and by model condition 4, we know that the value proposition 
initially Walking 
is true in ~.  That is, ~(E)  must satisfy the fluent formula Walking. It follows that 
• (e) also satisfies Alive and -7 Dead. Thus at this point we know everything about 
• (e) except whether or not it satisfies Loaded, so there are two states to consider. 
Consider the state S = { -7 Loaded, Afire, --1 Dead, Walking}. We will show that 
• (E) cannot be S, which will be sufficient to show that ~(E)= ~1(~). Since D 1 
includes the executability proposition impossible Shoot if -7 Loaded we know that 
Shoot is prohibited in S. It follows that there can be no explicit effect E of Shoot 
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in S, which allows us to conclude that Res(Shoot, S) is empty. Now, by model 
condition 4 we know that D 1 must satisfy the value proposition 
Walking after Shoot 
so we can conclude that Shoot ~ Dom(~). It follows by model condition 3 that 
•(Shoot) ~ Res(Shoot,~(E)). Since Res(Shoot, S) = O, we have ~(e)  v~ S. So 
• (E) = ~1(•). And since we've already seen that Res(Shoot, ~1(•)) = {~l(Sh°°t)}, 
we can conclude by model conditions 2 and 3 that ~(Shoot) = ~l(Shoot), which is 
sufficient o establish the fact that • = ~1. So ~1 is the unique model of D 1. 
5. REPRESENTING ACTIONS IN DEFAULT LOGIC 
We begin by defining a class of ~ '~ domain descriptions called "qualification-free." 
Roughly speaking, in qualification-free domain descriptions, all action precondi- 
tions are stated "explicitly," in the form of executability propositions. We will 
specify a sound and complete translation of qualification-free ~ domain descrip- 
tions into default theories. We will also specify a second, simpler translation for 
those d~ domain descriptions in which there are no action preconditions whatso- 
ever. These embeddings build on previous work in [Tur94, LT95, PT95]. 
We then compare the formalization of the Yale Shooting domain [HM87] 
obtained by our translation with the default theories discussed by Hanks and 
McDermott [HM87] and by Morris [Mor88]. 
5.1. Embedding 5~'~ in Default Logic 
We say that an 5,¢~' domain description is qualification-free if for all action names 
A and states S, A is prohibited in S whenever Res(A, S) is empty. 
Our default theories for reasoning about action use the situation calculus. For 
any fluent formula ~b, we write Holds(c~, S) to stand for the formula obtained by 
replacing each fluent atom F in 4~ by Holds(F, S). (Notice that the special atoms 
True and False are not replaced.) Given an action string AI; . . .  ;Am, we write 
[A1;...;Am] 
to stand for the term 
Result (A m, Result (A m -1 ..... Result ( A1, S O ). . .  )). 
Given an atomic value proposition 4~ after ~ we write 
a er X] 
to stand for the formula 
(Holds( [ A-l) A Reachable([ A-I)) 
Given a (nonatomic) value proposition V, we write [V] to stand for the formula 
obtained by simultaneously replacing each atomic value proposition V' that occurs 
in V by the formula [V']. 
The translation 6 takes an d~'  domain description D to a default theory 6(D) 
over the language -~(U), where U is the least set of atoms such that, for every 
action string x~ the following two conditions are satisfied: (i) Reachable([.~]) ~U; 
( i i )  for every fluent name F, Holds( F, [.T]) ~ U. 
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For each value proposition V in D, 6(D) includes the rule 
~[V]  
False 
For each sufficiency proposition ¢ suffices for q, in D, 6(D) includes the rule 
Holds( qb ,s) A Reachable(s) 
Holds( ~O, s) 
For each effect proposition A causes ~b if q, in D, 6(D) includes the rule 
Holds( qJ, s) A Reachable( Result( A, s) ) 
Holds( 6, Result( A, s ) ) 
For each influence proposition A possibly changes F if ~b in D, ~(D)  includes the 
pair of rules 
Holds ( ~b, s) /x Reachable( Result ( A, s) ): Holds (F, Result ( A, s) ) 
Holds( F, Result(As)) 
and 
Holds(~O,s)/~ Reachable(Result(A,s)) : ~ Holds( F, Result(A,s)) 
-1 Holds( F, Result( A, s)) 
For each executability proposition impossible A if q, in D, 6(D) includes the rule 
Holds( ~b, s) 
Reachable( Result( A, s) ) 
Default heory 6(D) also includes the additional, standard rules shown in Figure 6. 
The following theorem shows that the translation 6 is indeed sound and 
complete for qualification-free o~ domain descriptions. 
Theorem 5.1 (Embedding Theorem). Let D be a qualification-free ~ domain 
description. A value proposition V is entailed by D if and only if the formula IV] is 
entailed by the default heory 6( D). 
Reachability axioms. Default theory $(D) includes the rules 
: Reach~bZe(,) and ,Re,,chable(,) 
Reachable(s) -~Reachable( Result(a, s))" 
Initial situation axioms. For each fluent literal L, 5(D) includes the rule 
: Holds(L, So) 
Hotds( Z, So) 
Inertia axioms. For each frame fluent literal L, 6(D) includes the rule 
Holds(L, s) A Reachable(Result(a, 8)): Holds(L, Resnd~(a, s)) 
~oZ~ (z,, R,~,,uuCa, )) 
FIGURE 6. Standard elements of the translation 6. 
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The Embedding Theorem is an immediate consequence of the following stronger 
theorem, which is proved in Appendix B. 
Theorem 5.2 (Correspondence Theorem). Let D be a qualification-free ~¢~ domain 
description. There is a one-to-one correspondence b tween models of D and consis- 
tent extensions of 8( D) such that, for every model • of D and its corresponding 
extension E, a value proposition V is true in • if and only if [V] ~E. 
For example, recall domain description D~, in which Dead is a nonframe fluent 
always Dead =- ~ Alive 
initially Walking 
Walking after Shoot 
-~ Alive suffices for -~ Walking 
Shoot causes Dead A ~ Loaded 
impossible Shoot if -~ Loaded. 
Domain description D~ entails, for instance, the value proposition 
initially Loaded 
and the Embedding Theorem guarantees that the corresponding formula 
Holds( Loaded, S O ) /x Reachable( S o) 
is entailed by the corresponding default heory 6(D~), listed in Figure 7. 
~e ^ Reachable(8) -.(Holds( Wa&in~, So) ^  Reachable(so)) 
Holds(Dead, 8) -- ~aolds( a Uve, .) Fat~e 
-~(~Holds( Walking, a~.~U( Shoo,, So)) ^  a~=chable( aes=U( Shoo,, So))) 
Fa~e 
~Holds( Alive, 8) ^  Reachable(s) ~Holds( Lo=ded, ,) 
-~Holds( Walking, s) -~Reaehable( Result( Shoot, s) ) 
T~,e ^  neachable( nes,,U( Shoot, 8)) 
Holds(Dead, Re.ult( Shoot, 8)) A -Holds(Loaded, Re.ult( Shoot, 8)) 
: Holds(f, So) : ~Holds(y, So) : Reachable(8) ~nea~h=bZ~(.) 
Holds(f, So) ".Holds(f, So) Reachable(s) .Reachable(Reault(a, s))
aolds( aa~e, 8) ^  aeachable( a~8~(=, 8)): Holds( ali~e, n.=U(~, 8)) 
HoldsC aa~e, aes=uC~, 8)) 
-~Holds( Ali~e, s) ^  Reachable(Result(a, 8)): -.Holds( Alive~ Result(a, s) ) 
~Holds(.4ti~, Re.~,U(~, 8)) 
aotds( Zoadea, 8) ^  aea~habl~( aes=tt(=, 8)): Hotds( roaae~, n~,,U~(=, 8)) 
Holds( Loade~, ae,nU(a, 8)) 
-,Hotds(Zoa~e~, 8) ^  aea~J, abte(ae,=U(~, 8)): -,Holds(Loaded, a~8uU(~, 8)) 
~Hotds( Zoaded, Re~nU(~, 8)) 
Holds( Walking, 8) ^  Rcac~able( ae.~t(~, .) ) : ~olds(WaZ~ng, Re.~U(~, 8)) 
Holds(Wa&ing, aes~U(=, 8)) 
-~Holds( Walking, s) A Reachable( Reault(a, 8)): -~Holds( Walking, Result(a, 8)) 
~olds( Walki.g, Re.,,U(,=, 8)) 
F IGURE 7. The translation ~(D~) of oCc~ domain description D 1. 
264 H. TURNER 
If a domain description i cludes no executability propositions, we can eliminate 
the Reachable atoms in the corresponding default heory, thus obtaining a simpler 
translation, as follows. Let D be an ~ domain description. By 6'(D) we denote 
the default heory obtained from 6(D) by first eliminating the reachability axioms 
and then replacing each Reachable atom in the remaining rules by the special atom 
True. Of course it is then straightforward to eliminate the resulting occurrences of 
True in the resulting default heory. Notice that the default heories in Examples 1
and 2 in Section 2 can be obtained by translation 6'. 
For each atomic value proposition 4' after .~ let 
[4' after X~ 
denote the formula 
Holds( 4',[ Aq) 
and for each (nonatomic) value proposition V, let EV) be the formula obtained 
from V by simultaneously replacing each atomic value proposition V' that occurs 
in V by the formula IV'). 
Corollary 5.1 (Reachability Corollary). Let D be a qualification-free 5g~ domain 
description with no executability propositions. There is a one-to-one correspondence 
between models olD and consistent extensions of ~ '(D) such that, for every model 
of D and its corresponding extension E, a value proposition V is true in • if and 
only if [V) ~ E. 
5.2. Comparison with Previous Approaches 
At this point it may be interesting to briefly consider some of the ways in which our 
default heory for the Yale Shooting domain [HM87] differs from the one proposed 
and found inadequate by Hanks and McDermott [HM87], and from the more 
adequate solution later proposed by Morris [Mor88]. 
We represent the Yale Shooting domain by the 5~'~ domain description 
initially Alive 
Load causes Loaded 
Shoot causes -7 Alive if Loaded. 
Of course this domain description entails the d~ value proposition 
-~ Alive after Load; Wait; Shoot 
and accordingly, we know by the Reachability Corollary that the corresponding 
literal 
-~ Holds( Alive, Result( Shoot, Result( Wait, Result( Load, So) ))) 
is a consequence of the corresponding default theory 1:1, which appears in Fig- 
ure 8. 
By comparison, the default heory that was introduced and rejected by Hanks 
and McDermott [HM87] is (essentially) the default theory Y2 that appears in 
Figure 9. In default heory Y2, the well-known technical difficulty results from the 
fact that we can reason "backwards in time," using the rule describing the effect of 
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-~Holds( Alive, So) 
False 
~te  
Holds(Loaded, Res~U( Lo~d, a) ) 
: Holds(f, SO) 
Holds(f, So) 
Holds(f, s) :  Holds(f, Result(a, s)) 
Holds(f, ResuU( a, s ) ) 
Holds(Loaded, s) 
-~Holds( Alive, Result(Shoot, s) ) 
: ~nom(f ,  So) 
~Holds(f , so) 
-~Holds(f , s) :  -~Holds(f , Result(a, s)) 
-~Holds(f , Result(a, s) ) 
FIGURE 8. Default heory Y1. 
Shoot and the inertia rules. In particular, by such "backwards" reasoning, we can 
derive 
Ab (Loaded, Wait, Result( Load, S 0) ) 
and 
Holds( Loaded, Result(Wait, Result( Load, S 0) )) 
from the default "supposition" 
Ab ( Alive, Shoot, Result (Wait, Result ( Load, S o ) ) ) 
thus obtaining the famous anomaly: according to default theory Y2 the gun may 
become mysteriously unloaded uring the wait action. 
There is another peculiarity to be noted here, related to the fact that in the Yale 
Shooting domain (as originally described by Hanks and McDermott) we are not 
told whether or not the gun is initially loaded. Accordingly, the :~¢~" domain 
description entails neither 
initially Loaded 
nor 
initially -1 Loaded. 
From the Reachability Corollary it follows, for instance, that our default heory Y1 
does not entail the literal -~ Holds(Loaded, So). 
T~e True 
~Iolds(Ali~e, So) Ab(Zoade~, Load, s) ^  HoLds(Loaded, Res~Zt(Load, s)) 
True 
Holds(Loaded, s) D ( A b( Ali~e, Shoot, s) ^  -aHolds( Alive, Resulg( Shoot, a) ) ) 
7~e 
(Holds(f, s) A -~Ab(f , 6, s) ) D Holds(f, Result(¢, s) ) 
True 
(-~Holds(f , s) ^  -~Ab(f , a, s) ) D ~Holds(f , Result(a, s) ) 
: -~Ab(f, a, s) 
~Ab(f ,a,s)  
FIGURE 9. Default heory }12- 
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By comparison, in the default theory Y2 of Hanks and McDermott, we can 
"suppose" 
Ab( Alive, Shoot, So) 
and from this default supposition we can derive 
Holds( Loaded, S o ) 
by reasoning "backwards in time," using the rule describing the effect of the shoot 
action. This "backwards" reasoning seems a little suspicious, but so far we have 
only made an informal argument suggesting that ~ Holds(Loaded, S o) belongs to 
some extension of the default theory, which is of course not unexpected, since the 
~¢~' domain description itself has a model in which Loaded is initially false. But as 
it turns out, -7 Holds(Loaded, S o ) belongs to every extension of the default theory 
of Hanks and McDermott, which is therefore not only incomplete for the Yale 
Shooting domain, but also unsound. 
Next consider the default theory for the Yale Shooting domain proposed by 
Morris [Mor88], which is (essentially) the default theory Y3 shown in Figure 10. 
Even in Morris' default theory it appears that we can reason "backwards in time," 
using the rule describing the effect of the action Shoot. But notice that there is 
now no default rule allowing us to "suppose" literals of the form --1 Ab(f, a, s). 
Moreover, there is no opportunity for "inappropriately" deriving atoms of the form 
Ab(f, a, s) by reasoning backwards in time. Thus the famous anomaly is eliminated. 
On the other hand, it turns out that the formula ~ Holds(Loaded, S o) is once again 
inappropriately entailed. To see this, notice first that we cannot derive the literal 
Ab( Alive, Shoot, So) 
in default theory Y3. Because of this, we are able to derive 
Holds( Alive, Result( Shoot, S o) ) 
using one of the default rules expressing the common sense law of inertia. And, 
from this, we can derive 
Holds( Loaded, S o) 
by reasoning backwards in time, using the rule describing the effect of the shoot 
action. Thus, Morris' default theory for the Yale Shooting domain is, apparently, 
complete but unsound. 
True True 
Hotds(Ati~e, So) A~(Lo~a, Zo~d, s) ^  Hot~(r.o~de~, R~.~U(Lo~d, ~)) 
2arue 
Ho~a.(Lo~d~d, ~) ~ (A~(aZiw, Shoo~, s) ^  -~noZ~( A~i~, R~.~U( Shoo~, ~) ) ) 
Hot.(f, R~s~U(., .)) -not,U(f, R~.,,U(~, ~)) 
FIGURE 10. Default theory ]13. 
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It may be helpful to point out that the observed unsoundness of default theories 
Y2 and Y3 can be overcome simply by adding to them the following rules enforcing 
completeness of the initial situation 
:Holds(f, So) : 7 Holds(f, So) 
Holds(f, So) Holds(f, So) " 
Recall that these rules are standard elements of our translations from d~ into 
default logic. In a manner of speaking, they force a default theory to take into 
account every possible initial situation. 
In our translations from ~¢~ into default logic, every default rule is either 
normal or justification-free. In this way our approach is simpler than that of 
Morris, which uses non-normal defaults, as well as an auxiliary predicate Ab. 
Moreover, our method has the considerable advantage of guaranteeing correct 
representations of common sense knowledge for a wide variety of action domains. 
6. LOGIC PROGRAMS FOR REPRESENTING ACTIONS 
We begin by identifying a syntactically restricted class of ~ '~ domain descriptions 
for which the translation into logic programming is particularly convenient. We call 
such domain descriptions "simple." After specifying a sound and complete transla- 
tion of simple, qualification-free domain descriptions into logic programming, we 
go on to consider a somewhat broader class of ~a/~ domain descriptions, which we 
call "vivid." We show how every vivid, qualification-free domain description can be 
transformed into an equivalent simple, qualification-free domain description. Thus 
we obtain a correct embedding in logic programming for every vivid, qualification- 
free o~ domain description. Finally we briefly compare our work with previous 
similar work. 
In the case of value propositions, the translation into logic program rules is 
rather more complicated than the translation into default rules specified in the 
previous section. For all other d~ propositions, the translation is essentially the 
same. 
6.1. Simple Domain Descriptions 
We say that an atomic value proposition is simple if it has the form 
L after/T 
where L is a fluent literal, and we say that a (nonatomic) value proposition is 
simple if it has the form 
VIV ' "VVmV'~Vm+1V" 'V  -~V~ (O<_m<_n,n>O) 
where each V i (1 < i _< n) is a simple atomic value proposition. 
We say that a sufficiency proposition is simple if it has either the form 
L l A "" A L n suffices for L0, (n > 0) 
where each L i (0 _< i _< n) is a fluent literal, or the form 
always L, 
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where L is a fluent literal, or the form 
neverL 1A . . .AL~,  (n>0)  
where each L i (1 < i < n) is again a fluent literal. 
We say that an effect proposition is simple if it has either the form 
A causes Lo if L l  A ... A L ~, (n>0)  
where each L i (0 < i < n) is a fluent literal, or the form 
A causes L, 
where L is a fluent literal. 
We say that an influence proposition is simple if it has either the form 
A possibly changes F if L 1 A ... A L~, (n > 0) 
where each L i (1 _< i < n) is a fluent literal, or the form 
A possibly changes F. 
Finally, we say that an executability proposition is simple if it has the form 
impossible A if L 1 A ... A L~, (n > 0) 
where each L i (1 < i < n) is a fluent literal. 
We say that an ~¢~' domain description is simple if all of its propositions are. 
Perhaps the most severe restriction on simple domain descriptions is that they 
cannot include explicit definitions, due to the restricted form of sufficiency proposi- 
tions. Notice that three of the four example domain descriptions considered in 
Section 2 are in fact simple domain descriptions. 
6.2. Embedd ing  S imple  Domain  Descr ipt ions  in Log ic  P rogramming 
Let D be a simple ~ domain description. We define its translation into a logic 
program rr(D) as follows. 
For each value proposition V 1 v -.. v V,~ v ~ V m ÷ 1 v ... v ~ Vn in D, include 
the rule 
False ~- ~Vm + 1~, . . . , E Vn), not~Vl~ . . . . .  not~Vm). 
For each sufficiency proposition in D of the form L 1 A -.. A L ,  suffices for L 0 
include the rule 
Holds(  Lo , s)  ~ Holds(  L 1 , s) . . . .  , Holds(  L~ , s ) , Reachab le (s ) .  
For each sufficiency proposition in D of the form always L include the rule 
Holds(  L ,  s) ~ Reachab le (s ) .  
For each sufficiency proposition in D of the form never  L 1 A . - .  A L,  include the 
rule 
False ~ Holds ( L 1, s)  . . . .  , Holds ( L n, s ) , Reachab le (s ) .  
For each effect proposition in D of the form A causes L 0 if L 1 A -.. A L~ include 
the rule 
Holds(  Lo,  Result(  A ,  s)  ) ,-- Holds(  L 1 , s) . . . . .  Holds(  Ln,  s ) ,  
Reachable(  Result(  A ,  s ) ) . 
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For each influence proposition in D of the form 
A poss ib ly  changes  F i f  L 1 A --- A L n 
include the following two rules 
Holds( F, Resu l t (A ,s ) )  ~- Holds( L 1 , s ) . . . . .  Holds( Ln , s ), 
Reachable( Result( A ,  s) ),  
not ~ Holds( F, Result( A ,  s) ) 
Holds( F, Resu l t (Z ,s ) )  ~ Holds( t 1 , s ) . . . . .  Holds( t n , s ), 
Reachable( Result ( A ,  s) ),  
not  Holds(F, Result( A, s ) ) . 
For each influence proposition in D of the form A possibly changes F include the 
following two rules 
Holds(F, Result(A, s) ) ,-- Reachable( Result( A ,  s) ),  
not -7 Holds( F, Result( A ,  s ) ) 
Holds(F, Result(A, s) ) , -  Reachable( Result( A ,  s) ),  
not Holds( F, Result( A ,  s ) ) . 
Finally, for each executability proposition impossible A if L 1/x . . -AL ,  in D, 
include the rule 
-~ Reachable(s) ~ Holds( L 1 , s ), . . . , Holds( L ,  , s ) . 
Also include the following six standard rules for reachability, completeness of the 
initial situation, and the commonsense law of inertia 
Reachable(s) 
-1 Reachable( Result( a, s) ) 
Holds( f ,  S O ) 
Ho lds( f ,  So) 
Holds( f ,  Result( a, s ) ) 
-~ Holds( f ,  Result(a, s ) ) 
not ~ Reachable(s) 
~ Reachable(s) 
not ~ Ho lds( f ,  So) 
not Ho lds ( f ,  So) 
• - Holds( f, s), Reachable( Result( a ,s ) ) ,  
not ~ Holds(f, Result(a, s) ) 
~ Holds( f ,  s) ,  Reachable( Result(a, s ) ) ,  
not Holds( f ,  Result(a, s ) ) . 
Notice that the logic program in the fourth example in Section 2 can be 
obtained by the translation 7r. 
Theorem 6.1 (LP Embedding Theorem). Let D be a simple, qualification-free ~¢~ 
domain description. A simple atomic value proposition L after .,~/s entailed by D if 
and only if the literal Holds(L,  [ A]) is entailed by the logic program rr( D ). 
The LP Embedding Theorem is an immediate consequence of the following 
stronger theorem, which is proved in Appendix B using the Correspondence 
Theorem for default logic. 
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Theorem 6.2 (LP Correspondence Theorem). Let D be a simple, qualification-free 
~¢~ domain description. There is a one-to-one correspondence b tween models of D 
and consistent answer sets of 7r(D) such that, for every model • of D and 
corresponding answer set X,  a simple value proposition 
Va V . . .  V Vm v ~Vm+lV "'" V -qV  n 
is true in • if and only if at least one of the sets {EV1~ . . . . .  ~Vm~} AX and 
{[ Vm + 1 ~ . . . . .  [ V n ~} \ X is nonempty. 
If a simple domain description includes no executability propositions, we can 
eliminate the Reachable atoms in the corresponding logic program, thus obtaining 
a simpler translation. So let D be a simple ~¢'~ domain description without 
executability propositions. By rr'(D) we denote the logic program obtained from 
~-(D) by first eliminating the reachability axioms and then deleting all Reachable 
atoms from the remaining rules. Notice that the logic program in the third example 
in Section 2 can be obtained by the translation 7r'. 
Corollary 6.1 (LP Reachability Corollary). Let D be a simple, qualification-free d~ 
domain description without executability propositions. There is a one-to-one corre- 
spondence between models o lD  and consistent answer sets of 7r '( D ) such that, for 
every model qr of D and corresponding answer set X,  a simple value proposi- 
tion V 1 V "" V V m V ~ g m + 1 k/ "'" V "1 V n is true in • if and only if the set 
{EVI) . . . . .  EVm~, [ V--~+ 1 I]. . . . .  ~P-~} n X is nonempty. 
6.3. Making Vivid Domain Descriptions Simple 
The syntactic restrictions which define the class of simple domain descriptions 
are, fortunately, more strict than necessary. In this subsection we show that a 
much broader class of ~ '~ domain descriptions can be embedded into logic 
programming. 
We say that a sufficiency proposition is vivid if it has either the form 
~b suffices for ~b, 
where ~b is a nonempty conjunction of fluent literals, or the form 
~b suffices for False. 
Similarly, we say that an effect proposition is vivid if it has the form 
A causes ~b if ~b, 
where ~b is a nonempty conjunction of fluent literals. 
We say that a domain description is vivid if all of its sufficiency propositions and 
effect propositions are. Any vivid domain description can be transformed into an 
equivalent simple domain description, in the manner described below. 
We begin by assuming a function CNF that takes every fluent formula ~ to an 
equivalent fluent formula CNF(4~) in conjunctive normal form, in which the special 
atoms True and False do not occur. We also assume a function DNF that takes 
every fluent formula 4, to an equivalent fluent formula DNF(~)  in disjunctive 
normal form, in which the special atoms True and False do not occur. 
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For any atomic value proposition 05 after .~ let CNF(05 after A)  be the result 
of simultaneously replacing each disjunct L of each conjunct of CNF(05) with the 
simple atomic value proposition L after • Notice that 05 after A is true in a 
structure qt if and only if CNF(05 after ~T) is. 
Next we describe a three-step transformation that takes any value proposition V
to a corresponding family of simple value propositions. 
1. Let V= be the result of simultaneously replacing each atomic value proposi- 
tion V' that occurs in V with the value proposition CNF(V'). Notice that V~ 
is a propositional combination of simple atomic value propositions. Notice 
also that V is true in a structure • if and only if V s is. 
2. Let C be the set of conjuncts of the conjunctive normal form of V=. Notice 
that each member of C is a disjunction of simple atomic value propositions 
or their negations. Notice also that V~ is true in a structure q~ if and only if 
every member of C is. 
3. Take the set of value propositions obtained by reordering the literals of each 
member of C so that each of the resulting expressions is a simple value 
proposition. 
Observe that V is true in a structure • if and only if all of the corresponding 
simple value propositions are. 
For any vivid sufficiency proposition 05 suffices for ~b, take the family of simple 
sufficiency propositions 05' suffices for L such that 05' is a disjunct of DNF(05) and 
L is a conjunct of ~b. 
For any vivid effect proposition A causes 05 if ~b, take the family of simple 
effect propositions A causes L if ~b' such that L is a conjunct of 05 and ~b' is a 
disjunct of DNF(~b). 
For any influence proposition A possibly changes F if ~, take the family of 
simple influence propositions A possibly changes F if ~b' such that ~b' is a disjunct 
of DNF( ~b ). 
Finally, for each executability proposition impossible A if ~b, take the family of 
simple executability propositions impossible A if ~b' such that ~b' is a disjunct of 
DNF( gt ). 
Let Simple be a function that takes every vivid domain description to a simple 
domain description that can be obtained by transforming each of its propositions in 
the manner described above. 
Theorem 6.3 (Vivid Domains Theorem). Let D be a vivid d~ domain description. 
The domain descriptions D and Simple(D) have the same models. Moreover, D is 
qualification-free if and only if Simple(D) is. 
Since we have already specified a correct embedding of simple, qualification-flee 
domain descriptions into logic programming, the Vivid Domains Theorem estab- 
lishes the more general fact that every vivid, qualification-flee domain description 
can be correctly embedded in logic programming, by first transforming it into an 
equivalent simple, qualification-flee domain description. For instance, the logic 
program in the first example in Section 2 can be obtained in this manner. 
Finally, it is clear from the previous discussion that any value proposition V can 
be transformed into a family Q of simple value propositions such that V is true in 
a structure ~ if and only if every member of Q is. Thus we have shown that the LP 
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Correspondence Theorem can be applied to any value proposition, for any vivid 
qualification-free ~¢~ domain description. 
6.4. Comparison with Previous Similar Work 
Previous work on translations from high-level action languages into logic program- 
ming has for the most part focused on the action language ~¢ [GL93]. 1° All such 
translations have been restricted to "consistent" domain descriptions. For now we 
will refer to the set of all such ~¢' domain descriptions as "consistent d . "  
The portion of the language d~ that we correctly embed in logic programming 
subsumes consistent ~¢ [GL93]. In fact, consistent zg corresponds to a strict subset 
of the simple, qualification-free ~¢~ domain descriptions. By way of comparison, 
the original translation in [GL93] of consistent ~¢ into logic programming was 
partial-- it  was not sound for some consistent o~' domain descriptions--and incom- 
plete. Later sound and complete translations of consistent ~ utilized extensions or 
variants of logic programming: abductive logic programming [DD93, Dun93], 
equational logic programming [Thi94], or disjunctive logic programming [Tur94]. 
For the portion of ~ '  that corresponds to consistent ~¢, our sound and complete 
translation It' is arguably simpler than any of those previously published, and does 
not require abduction or disjunction. Furthermore, the portion of ~¢~ that we 
embed in logic programming--that is, the set of all vivid, qualification-free ~¢~ 
domain descriptions--is considerably more expressive than consistent ~¢', since it 
allows nonatomic value propositions, nondeterministic a tions, causal background 
information and action preconditions. 
7. REMARKS ON THE ACTION LANGUAGE .a¢~' 
The action language ~¢'~ closely resembles the language ~¢~ of Giunchiglia, 
Kartha and Lifschitz [GKL95] and its predecessor ~¢~0 [KL94]. Unlike the lan- 
guage ~¢~, ~¢~' allows non-Boolean fluents; but if we consider only the proposi- 
tional portion of z¢~, we find that the model structures for the languages are 
identical. 
Syntactically, ~¢~ and d~'  are very similar. One difference is that ~¢',P~ does not 
include sufficiency propositions for representing background knowledge, which is 
instead represented by means of state constraints of the form always ~b where ~b is 
a fluent formula. In ~e'~ we understand such an expression as an abbreviation of 
the corresponding sufficiency proposition True suffices for ~b. Thus ~¢~ state 
constraints are well-formed ~¢~ propositions. Another significant syntactic differ- 
ence between ~¢~ and ~a¢~' is that ~¢~ includes only atomic value propositions, 
whereas ~¢~ allows propositional combinations of atomic value propositions. A
third difference is that in ~¢A' the expression impossible A if ~b is an abbreviation 
for the effect proposition A causes False if ~p whereas in ~ these are distinct 
propositions. 11
1°An exception is [BG93], which translates the action language ~¢c--a language very similar to ~¢ but 
allowing concurrent and non-executable actions. But the translation there is similar to the translation of
.~" in [GL93], and exhibits imilar shortcomings. 
11 We have seen that this distinction becomes convenient when we specify the translations from ~'T 
into default logic and logic programming. 
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As the preceding observations suggest, the set of well-formed propositional zg~ 
expressions is a proper subset of the set of well-formed ~'  expressions. Given 
this, the relationship between ~ '~ and ~ '~ is captured in the following theorem. 
Theorem 7.1 (~ Theorem). Let D be a propositional ~ '~ domain description such 
that every nonframe fluent in D has an explicit definition in terms of frame fluents. 
D is an s¢~ domain description, and the ~¢~ models of D are exactly the 5g~q2 
models o lD.  
The statement of the ~¢~ Theorem reflects the fact that some propositional 
5g~' domain descriptions are not ~¢'~ domain descriptions. These are the proposi- 
tional ~¢~' domain descriptions in which there is a nonframe fluent that is not 
explicitly defined in terms of frame fluents. On the other hand, we have observed 
that some ~¢'~ domain descriptions are not 5v'~a~, domain descriptions. For example, 
consider the following ~¢~ formalization of the Two-Switches domain, adapted 
from [KL94] (and originally introduced in [Lif90]) 
Up( Switchl) =- Up( Switch2) suffices for On 
Up( Switchl) ~ Up(Switch2) suffices for -1 On 
Toggle(x) causes Up(x) if ~ Up(x)  
Toggle(x) causes ~ Up(x)  if Up(x) .  
The Two-Switches domain can be formalized in ~ '~ by declaring the fluent On 
to be nonframe and replacing the two sufficiency propositions by a single state 
constraint 
always On = (Up ( Switch I ) =- Up ( Switch 2 ) ). 
In modifying the domain description in this manner, we seem to be replacing 
causal information--the fact that the state of the switches "causally" determines 
the state of the l ight--with a "noncausal" explicit definition. But in doing so, we do 
not change the set of models. 12 
Let us consider a slight variant of the domain description from Example 2 
(Section 2), adapted from [Lin95], which demonstrates that it is not always possible 
to obtain intuitively correct results using state constraints augmented by the 
f rame/nonframe distinction. In this action domain, there is a spring-loaded brief- 
case with two clasps. We have actions that unfasten the clasps, one at a time. If 
both clasps are unfastened, the briefcase pops open. Initially the briefcase is not 
open and the second clasp is not fastened. We can conclude in this case that the 
briefcase is open after we unfasten the first clasp. We formalize this action domain 
in ~W as follows 
initially -7 Open A -~ Fastened( Clasp2 )
Unfasten( x ) causes ~ Fastened(x) 
Fastened( Claspl ) /x  -~ Fastened( Clasp2 ) suffices for Open. 
12Notice that in this case, the domain description we obtain is in fact a "legal" 5*¢~ ' domain 
description, since the nonframe fluent On is explicitly defined in terms of the frame fluent formula 
Up( Switch I )=- Up( Switch 2). 
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This domain description entails the value proposition 
Open after Unfasten(Clasp1). 
Traditionally, background knowledge in action domains has been represented in
the form of state constraints, which are, intuitively speaking, formulas of classical 
logic that are said to hold in every possible state of the world. Moreover, it has 
been common to use state constraints to derive indirect effects, or "ramifications" 
of actions, as is in fact done in the language ~¢~'. Thus, for example, one might 
think of writing the state constraint 
always ( -~ Fastened( Clasp1 ) A ~ Fastened(Clasp2)) D Open 
in place of 
-1 Fastened(Clasp1 ) A ~ Fastened(Clasp2) suffices for Open. 
But it seems that there is no way of designating frame and nonframe fluents that 
will allow the resulting ~'~' domain description to capture the intended models of 
the domain. For instance, if we declare Open nonframe, then the briefcase can 
open spontaneously, as it were, at any time. On the other hand, if we leave all 
fluents "in the frame," we find that unfastening the first clasp can sometimes have 
the unintended indirect effect of fastening the second clasp. 
Lin and Reiter [LR94] have suggested the name "ramification constraints" for 
state constraints that are used to derive indirect effects. For example, state 
constraints in the languages J~ '0  and ~O/' function as ramification constraints, as 
do state constraints in the action formalizations of Winslett [Win88] and Baker 
[Bak91]. One thing the d~ Theorem shows is that ~¢~ expressions of the form 
always 4, 
correspond precisely to state constraints in d~' .  Recall that in ~'~f such an 
expression stands for the sufficiency proposition 
True suffices for d~. 
It is natural to call such ~ propositions ramification constraints. 
Lin and Reiter [LR94] describe another use of state constraints: as so-called 
"qualification constraints." Qualification constraints are state constraints that 
simply restrict he state space; they do not themselves lead to any indirect effects. 
Qualification constraints are so-named because they can lead to "derived action 
preconditions," or "qualifications. ''13 It is straightforward to verify that g~ suffi- 
ciency propositions of the form 
d~ suffices for False 
in fact functions as qualification constraints, ince such propositions simply rule out 
any state in which ~b holds, without leading to any indirect effects. Recall that we 
abbreviate such sufficiency propositions as 
never ~b. 
It is natural to call such ~ propositions qualification constraints. 14 
13This idea was anticipated byGinsberg and Smith [GS88]. 
~4 Much of this discussion is adapted from [MT95b], where the relationship ofstatic ausal laws to 
ramification and qualification constraints is addressed in a more abstract setting. 
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As an example of an ~¢~ domain description involving a qualification con- 
straint, consider the following formalization of the Emperor Domain of Lin and 
Reiter [LR94] 
never Yellow( Block I ) A Yellow( Block 2) 
Paint(x) causes Yellow(x). 
This domain description does not entail the ~ value proposition 
Yellow( Block z) after Paint( Block 2), 
but it does entail the following weaker proposition. 
(initially -~ Yellow (Block I)) - (Yellow( Block 2) after Paint( Block 2)). 
This reflects the fact that it is possible to paint the second block yellow if and only 
if the first block is not already yellow. Observe that in this case, in order to obtain 
an equivalent ~ '  domain description we replace the sufficiency proposition with 
the state constraint 
always ~ (Yellow ( Block 1 ) A Yellow (Block 2 )) 
and also explicitly describe the action preconditions, as follows 
impossible Paint( Block I) if Yellow( Block 2) 
impossible Paint( Block e) if Yellow( Block 1 ). 
Up to now we have not presented an example in which it is natural to use a 
ramification constraint (except o introduce an explicit definition). So consider a 
blocks world in which there are two blocks (A,B) and four locations (1,2,3,4). 
Each block is always in exactly one location. There are never two blocks in the 
same location. For each block, there is a move action that changes its location. We 
can describe this action domain in ~¢~ as follows. 
always Loc( x, 1) V Loc( x, 2) V Loc(x, 3) V Loc(x, 4) 
always -~Loc(x,m) V -~Loc(x,n) (m Cn)  
never Loc( A, n) A Loc( B, n) 
Move(x) causes ~ Loc( x, n) if Loc( x, n). 
This domain description entails, for instance, the value propositions 
(initially Loc ( A, 1) A Loc ( B, 2) ) D ( Loc ( A, 3) ~ Loc ( A, 4) after Move (A )) 
and 
( Loc ( A, 1) after Move ( A ) ) D initially -7 Loc ( B, 1). 
Sufficiency propositions are closely related to inference rules, as is apparent 
from the definition of Res in the semantics of ~ .  Brewka and Hertzberg [BH93] 
use inference rules to encode causal background knowledge for reasoning about 
action. Their definition differs markedly from ours though. For instance, as we 
point out in [MT95b], their approach cannot capture the notion of qualification 
constraints. In fact, it sometimes yields different results even when derived action 
preconditions are not involved. 
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The idea for the fixpoint definition of Res adopted in the semantics of ~¢'~' was 
introduced in a pair of related papers [MT95b, PT95]. In [MT95b] we show how the 
fixpoint definition can be derived as a natural extension of the corresponding 
definition from Winslett's [Win88] possible models approach to reasoning about 
the effects of actions. In [PT95] the idea is explored in the more abstract setting of 
theory update. There we introduce a fixpoint definition of "rule update"--update 
by means of arbitrary sets of inference rules--and show that rule update not only 
extends Winslett's update definition but also extends the notion of revision pro- 
gramming, introduced by Marek and Truszczyfiski [MT93, MT94, MT95a]. 
In other recent related work, Baral [Bar95] proposes an action description 
language based closely upon revision programming. The semantics of his action 
language is given directly in terms of a translation into disjunctive logic programs. 
This would seem to be a weakness of his proposal, since disjunctive logic programs 
are relatively difficult to reason about. Nonetheless, it seems that where Baral's 
proposal overlaps with ours, it agrees. Lin [Lin95] introduces a circumscriptive 
approach to causal theories of action that is closely related to his previous work 
with Reiter [LR94]. Lin shows that for a special class of action descriptions, the 
meaning of a description can be obtained by a reasonably straightforward comple- 
tion process; but in the general case, the semantics of Lin's action descriptions i
given in terms of a complex minimization process. In the case of what Lin calls a 
"stratified" theory, it appears that Lin's proposal will agree with ours. Thielscher 
[Thi95] extends previous work, by himself and his colleagues, on reasoning about 
action in the formalism of equational logic programming. His proposal involves the 
use of state constraints accompanied by auxiliary information about directional, 
causal relationships between pairs of fluent atoms. The semantics of his action 
description language is given by a definition that is essentially procedural, and in 
fact seems motivated by computational (rather than declarative) concerns. It is 
unclear to what extent his proposal overlaps with ours. 
One advantage of the action description language ~¢~" over those of [Bar95, 
Lin95, Thi95] is that it naturally accommodates the use of arbitrary propositional 
formulas in the description of static causal aws and effects of actions. This makes 
it possible to express traditional ramification constraints, for instance. Also, recall 
that such formulas are used when explicit definitions are introduced. Another 
advantage is that ~¢¢f has a relatively transparent semantics, pecially tailored for 
action domains, in which there is a simple definition of possible next states that is 
used in a straightforward manner to constrain a situation calculus model structure. 
We conclude this section with three results concerning formal properties of .ae~', 
which are modeled on similar results for the language ~¢~ [GKL95]. We omit the 
proofs, which are reasonably straightforward. 
Theorem 7.2 (Replacement Theorem). Let D be an s¢~ domain description. Let T 
be a subset of the sufficiency propositions in D. Take 
RT=(~:d~suf f i ces for~b~T) .  
Let c~, c~' be fluent formulas such that (d~ =- 4") ~ Cn(RT). Let D' be an ~ 
domain description obtained from D by replacing some or all occurrences of c~ with 
c~' in some or all propositions that do not belong to T. Domain descriptions D and 
D' have the same models. 
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Corollary 7.1 (Explicit Definitions Corollary). Let D be an s¢~ domain description i  
which there is an explicit definition always F = c~ and furthermore there is no 
influence proposition A possibly changes F if ~b. Let D' be the domain description 
with fluents F \{F}  that can be obtained from D by deleting the explicit definition 
always F = ~b and replacing all remaining occurrences of F with dp. For every value 
proposition V in which F does not occur, V is true in D if and only if V is true in D'. 
Theorem 7.3 (Restricted Monotonicity Theorem). 15 Let D be an ~ domain 
description. If D' can be obtained by adding value propositions to D, then every 
value proposition entailed by D is also entailed by D'.15 
APPENDIX A: SPLITFING A DEFAULT THEORY 
In this appendix we briefly turn our attention from the specific problem of 
representing actions in default logic and logic programming, in order to present 
technical results concerning default theories in general. These results--the Split- 
ting Set Theorem and Splitting Sequence Theorem for default logic from [Tur96b] 
- -a re  needed for the proof of the Correspondence Theorem (in Appendix B). 
A.L  Splitting Sets 
Let D be a default theory over .ZF(U) such that, for every rule r ~ D, pre(r) is in 
conjunctive normal form. (Of course any default theory can be easily transformed 
into an equivalent default heory, over the same language, satisfying this condition.) 
For any rule r ~ D, a formula ~b is a constituent ofr if at least one of the following 
conditions holds: (i) q5 is a conjunct of pre(r); (ii) ~b ~just(r); (iii) ~b = cons(r). 
A splitting set for D is a subset A of U such that for every rule r ~ D the 
following two conditions hold. 
1. Every constituent of r belongs to 2 (A)  U.Z~(U\A). 
2. If cons(r) does not belong to Sa(U\A),  then r is a default rule over .~(A). 
If A is a splitting set for D, we say that A splits D. The base of D relative to A, 
denoted by bA(D), is the default theory over .~(A) that consists of all members of 
D that are default rules over S'~(A). 
Let U2 = {a, b, c, d}. Consider the following default theory D z over S'~(U2) 
:~b  :~a  avb:a ,b  aA(cVd) :~d bA(cVd) : -~c  
a b cvd  ~d ~c  
Take A 2 = {a, b}. It is easy to verify that A 2 splits D 2, with 
bA2( D2) = a b 
Notice that the default theory bAz(D 2) over .~za(A2 ) has two consistent extensions: 
CnA2({a}) and CnA2({b}). 
15See [Lif93] for a general account of "restricted monotonicity." 
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Given a splitting set A for D, and a set X of formulas from .~(A), the partial 
evaluation of D by X with respect o A, denoted by eA(D, X), is the default theory 
over . .~(U\A) obtained from D in the following manner. For each rule r ~ D \ 
bA(D) such that 
1. every conjunct of pre(r) that belongs to .Sa(A) also belongs to CnA(X), and 
2. no member of just(r) has its complement in CnA(X). 
there is a rule r' ~ eA(D, X)  such that 
1. pre(r') is obtained from pre(r) by replacing each conjunct of pre(r) that 
belongs to 2 (A)  by True, and 
2. just(r') =just(r) n .~(U\A) ,  and 
3. cons(r') = cons(r). 
For example, it is easy to verify that 
True True A ( c v d ) " ~ d ) 
eA2(D2'CnA2({a}))= cVd '  - -d  
and that 
[ True TrueA(cwd) :~c} 
eA2(D2'Cna2({b})) = t cv -d '  -~c " 
Let A be a splitting set for D. A solution to D with respect o A is a pair (X,  Y) 
of sets of formulas satisfying the following two properties: 
1. X is a consistent extension of the default theory bA(D) over 2 (A) .  
2. Y is a consistent extension of the defaulty theory eA(D, X)  over .~(U\A) .  
For example, given our previous observations, it is easy to verify that D 2 has two 
solutions with respect o A2: 
(CnA2({a}),Cnv2\A2({c, ~ d})> and (CnA2({b}),Cnv2\A2( { ~ c,d})) .  
Theorem A. 1 (Splitting Set Theorem). Let A be a splitting set for a default heory D 
over ~(U) .  A set E of formulas is a consistent extension of D if and only if 
E = Cnv(XU Y)  for some solution (X ,Y )  to D with respect o A. 
Thus, for example, it follows from the Splitting Set Theorem that the default 
theory D 2 has exactly two consistent extensions: 
Cnv~((a,c, ~ d}) and Cnu~((b, ~ c,d}).  
Corollary A. 1 (Splitting Set Corollary). Let A be a splitting set for a default heory D 
over .oCP(U). If  E is a consistent extension of D, then the pair 
(E E 
is a solution to D with respect o A. 
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A.2. Splitting Sequences 
A (transfinite) sequence is a family whose index set is an initial segment of ordinals 
{a :a  < p~}. We say that a sequence (A~) ,<u of sets is monotone if A~___A, 
whenever a </3, and continuous if, for each limit ordinal a < ~, A~ = O r < ~ A~. 
A splitting sequence for a default theory D over .9~(U) is a nonempty, monotone, 
continuous equence (A~)~ < ~, of splitting sets for D such that U ~ < ~,A~ = U. 
The definition of a solution with respect o a splitting set is extended to splitting 
sequences as follows. Let A = (A~) ,  < ~ be a splitting sequence for D. A solution 
to D with respect o A is a sequence (E~),, < ~ of sets of formulas that satisfies the 
following three conditions. 
1. E 0 is a consistent extension of the default theory bAo(D) over .£~(A0). 
2. For any o~ such that a + 1 < p, E,+ 1 is a consistent extension of the default 
theory 
T_<a 
over £~(A,+ 1 \A , ) .  
3. For any limit ordinal a </z, E ,  = Cn ~ (0). 
We generalize the Splitting Set Theorem as follows. 
Theorem A.2 (Splitting Sequence Theorem). Let A = ( A~)~ < ~, be a splitting se- 
quence for a default theory D over .~(U). A set E of formulas is a consistent 
extension of D if and only if 
for some solution ( E~ )~ <. to D with respect o A. 
The proof of this theorem relies on the Splitting Set Theorem. We also have the 
following counterpart to the Splitting Set Corollary. 
Corollary A.2 (Splitting Sequence Corollary). Let A = (A,,),~<+, be a splitting 
sequence for a default theory D over .9~(U). Let (U~)~ < ~, be the sequence of 
pairwise disjoint subsets of U such that for all a < tx 
=As\ U 
I f  E is a consistent extension of D, then the sequence ( E n .2~( U~ ) )6 < ~, is a solution 
to D with respect o A. 
APPENDIX B: PROOFS 
We first prove the Correspondence Theorem and Reachability Corollary, showing 
that the translations from J~ into default logic are sound and complete. 
On the basis of these results, we go on to prove the LP Correspondence 
Theorem and LP Reachability Corollary, showing the correctness of our transla- 
tions of simple, qualification-free ~ domain descriptions into logic program- 
ming. Finally we prove the Vivid Domains Theorem, which shows that every vivid 
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~¢~' domain description can be transformed into an equivalent simple domain 
description. 
B. 1. Proof of  Correspondence Theorem and Reachability Corollary 
Our primary task is to prove the special case of the Correspondence Theorem in 
which the domain description has no value propositions. We'll call this intermedi- 
ate result the Correspondence Lemma. Most of the work in this subsection is 
devoted to its proof. 
Let D be a qualification-free domain description without value propositions, 
with fluents F, and frame fluents Ff. We will show that there is a one-to-one 
correspondence b tween models of D and consistent extensions of 6(D) such that 
a value proposition V is true in a model of D if and only if the formula [V] 
belongs to the corresponding extension of 6(D). 
We begin with two fundamental lemmas. The first of these will be used to show 
that our default theory 6(D) correctly characterizes the possible initial situations. 
Let A 0 be the default theory 
RtO("----~:Lisafluentliteral). 
Notice that A 0 is default theory over .5~'(F). 
Lemma B.1. A consistent set X of fluent formulas is an extension of A o if and only if 
there is a state S such that X = CnF(S). 
PROOF. Recall that an interpretation S is a state if and only if Cnv(S) is closed 
under R. (Recall also that interpretations are maximal consistent sets of literals.) 
(Left-to-right) Assume that X is a consistent extension of A 0. It is easy to verify 
that, for every fluent F, either F or -7 F belongs to X. So there is an interpreta- 
tion S such that X = Cnr(S). Moreover, since R _c A x, we know that X is closed 
under R; so S is a state. 
(Right-to-left) Assume that S is a state, and take X = Cnr(S). It is easy to verify 
that 
AX=SuR 
from which it follows that X c_ Cnv(AX). Of course X is closed under S, and since 
S is a state, we know that X is also closed under R. And since X is logically closed, 
we can conclude that X= Cnv(AX). [] 
The second fundamental lemma will be used to show that in the consistent 
extensions of 6(D), noninitial situations respect he transition function Res. This 
result is very similar to an embedding theorem from [PT95]. 
For any state S and action name A, let A(A, S) be the default theory obtained 
by taking the union of the following four sets of rules. 
:L 
1. All rules of the form -~- where L is a frame fluent literal in S. 
2. E(A, S). 
:F :~F  
3. All rules of the forms - -  and - -  where F ~ F(A, S). 
F -~F 
4. R. 
Notice that A(A, S) is a default theory over 2(F ) .  
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Lemma B.2. Let S be a state and A an action that is not prohibited in S. The following 
hoM. 
1. A state S' belongs to Res(A, S) if and only if Cnv(S') is a consistent extension 
of A(A, S). 
2. If X is a consistent extension of A(A, S), then there is a state S' such that 
X = CnF(S'). 
PROOF. For the first part, let S' be a state, and let 
E =E(A ,S)  U (S'  A .ZP(F(A ,S) ) ) .  
Observe that E is an explicit effect of A in S. It is not difficult to verify that 
A(A ,s )C" (S"=(SAS ' AL i t (F f ) )uEuR.  
Thus we see that Cn(S') is a consistent extension of A(A,S)  if and only if 
Cn(S') = Cn[(S n S' n Lit(Fs)) u E u R]. 
Since E is an explicit effect of A in S, we have shown that if Cn(S') is a 
consistent extension of A(A, S) then S' E Res(A, S). To see the other direction, 
assume that S' ~ Res(A, S). Thus there is an explicit effect E '  of A in S such that 
Cn(S') = Cn[(S n S' o Lit(Fs)) u E '  u R]. It is clear that E '  = E(A, S) u (S' n 
Se(F(A, S))), which is to say that E '= E. Thus we can conclude that Cn(S') is a 
consistent extension of A(A, S). 
For the second part, assume that X is a consistent extension of A(A, S). 
Suppose there is a fluent name F such that F ~X and ~ F ~ X. Since every 
nonframe fluent in an ~¢~' domain description must have a definition in terms of 
frame fluents, we can assume without loss of generality that F is a frame fluent. 
But in this case, since S is a state, A(A, S) includes one of the following two rules. 
:F :~F  
F ~F  
From this we can conclude that Cn(A(A,S) x) includes either F or ~ F. So 
Cn(A(A, S) x) @X, which is a contradiction. So we have shown that for every fluent 
name F, either F ~ X or -7 F ~ X. And since X is consistent, it follows that there 
is an interpretation S' of _~(F) such that X = Cn(S'). Now, since A(A, S) contains 
the inference rules R, we know that Cn(S') is closed under R. So S' is a state. [] 
Next we prepare to move these results into the language of default theory 6(D). 
This will require three preliminary lemmas. 
Let U be the set of atoms such that .Zt(U) is the language of the default theory 
6(D). We can view .~(D)  as i_ncluding a tree of copies of the language .Z~(F): one 
copy for each action string A. For any set F of rules (that is, any combination of 
default rules, inference rules and formulas) over S'~(F) and any action string /~ let 
~(F, A )  denote the set of rules over .~(U) obtained by replacing each occurrence 
of each fluent atom F in F by the atom Holds(F, [A]). (Notice that occurrences of 
the special atoms True and False are left unchanged.) Observe that for each action 
string ~ the language .Zt(~(F, A) )  is a subset of _~(U) such that the rules over 
5¢(~(F, A )) and the rules over .~(F) are in one-to-one correspondence. 
Lemma B.3. For every set F of inference rules over -~(F) and every action string A, a 
set X of formulas from .Z~(F) is closed under F if and only if ~( X, A )  is closed 
under ~(F, A).  
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PROOF. (Left-to-right) Assume X is closed under F. Let r '  be a rule from E(F, A )  
such that pre(r')~ E(X,/T).  We must show that cons(r')~ E(X,/T).  We know 
there is a rule r ~ F such that r '  can be obtained from r by replacing each 
occurrence of each fluent atom F in r by the atom Holds(F, [A]). Since pre(r') 
E(X, ~T), we know that pre(r) ~X. Since X is closed under F, cons(r) ~X, from 
which it follows that cons(r') ~ E(X, A). Proof in the other direction is similar. 
[] 
Notice that the previous lemma is sufficient o establish also that X is logically 
closed if and only if E(X, A )  is. 
Lemma B. 4. For every set F of inference rules over S~(F) and every action string A, we 
have E(Cnv(F), A ) = Cn~(v, A-)(E(F, ,~)). 
PROOF. Follows easily from the previous lemma. [] 
Lemma B.5. For every default heory D over _~(F) and every action string A, a set X of 
formulas from .~(F) is an extension olD if and only if E( X, A)  is an extension of 
E(D, A). 
PROOF. By Lemma B.3 we know that X= Cnv(D x) if and only if E(X, A )= 
E(CnF(DX), A). By Lemma B.4 we have E(Cn~(DX), A) = Cn~ A-)(E(D x, A)). 
Finally, it is not diffficult to verify that E(D x, A )= "Z(D, A)  ~(x''y; which suffices 
to establish the lemma. [] 
In order to apply the two fundamental lemmas (B.I&B.2) to the default theory 
8(D), we will split 8(D) into simpler parts, using the Splitting Sequence Theorem. 
To this end, we introduce a partial mapping o- from an initial segment of ordinals 
{a : a </z} to action strings, which satisfies the following three conditions. 
1. For each action string A there is a nonlimit ordinal a</z  such that 
,~(~) =X 
2. For each nonlimit ordinal a </z  there is an action string X such that 
3. For all nonlimit ordinals a and /3 such that a </3 < ix, o-(a) ~ o-(/3) and 
the length of o-(a) is no greater than the length of or(/3). 
Notice that o'(0) = e. 
Let (U~)~<~ be the sequence of pairwise disjoint subsets of U with the 
following two properties. 
1. For each limit ordinal a < it, U, = Q. 
2. For each nonlimit ordinal a < it, U,~ consists of all atoms from U with the 
situation argument [ o- ( or)]. 
Let (A , )~ < u be the sequence of subsets of U such that for all a </z 
Ao=Uu . 
It is not difficult to verify that (A~)4 < u is a splitting sequence for 6(D). 
Now we can prove that default theory 8(D) is correct with respect o the initial 
situation So, which we can also write as [ E] and as [~r(0)]. We do this by showing 
that the default theory bAo(6(D)) behaves correctly, as follows. 
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Lemma B.6. A set X of formulas from _~( U o) is a consistent extension of bAo( 6( D ) ) if 
and only if there is a state S such that 
X = Cnvo[{Reachable(So) } L) ~,(S, e)].  
PROOF. It is easy to verify that 
:Reachable(S°) } 
bAo( 6( D ) ) = ~,( Ao, e) U Reachable(So ) . 
The lemma follows in a straightforward fashion from this observation, by Lemma 
B.1 and B.5. [] 
We next show that default theory 6(D) uses the structure of the situation 
calculus to build what is essentially a tree of embeddings of the definition of Res. 
For each a + 1 < IX, let 
D,,+, = bAa+l (6 (D) )  \bA. (a(D)). 
So D,+ 1 is the default heory over .g~'(A, + 1) which can be described as follows. Let 
Abe  the action string and A the action name such that o-(a + 1) =A,  A. For each 
sufficiency proposition & suffices for ¢/, in D, we have the rule 
Holds( 4~, [A; A ])/x Reachable([ A; A ]) 
Holds( O,[ X; A]) 
For each effect proposition A causes 4> if g, in D, we have the rule 
Holds( ~, [ A-I)/x Reachable([ A; A ]) 
Holds( ~,[/T; A]) 
For each influence proposition A possibly changes F if ~ in D, we have the rules 
Holds( ~0, [A-]) /x Reachable([ A; A ])" Holds(F, [ A; A ]) 
Holds( F, [.~; A ]) 
and 
Holds(~, [A--I)/x Reachable([.g; A ]):-~ Holds(F, [A; A ]) 
--1 Holds(F, [ _.~; A 1) 
For each executability proposition impossible A if ~b in D, we have the rule 
Holds( ~, [ AT) 
Reachable([ z~; _.4 ])" 
We also have a number of additional rules, as specified below. 
Reachability axioms. 
:Reachable([ A; A ]) ~ Reachable([ AT) 
and 
Reachable([ .,~; A ]) ~ Reachable([ .4; A ])" 
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Inertia axioms. For each frame fluent literal L, 
Holds(L, [ A-I)/x Reachable([ A; A ]): Holds(L, [ A; A ]) 
Holds( L, [ Y; A ]) 
For any set Y of formulas from _oW(A.), let 
E~+I(Y ) = eAo(D~+~,Y). 
Notice that E~+i(Y) is a default heory over 2(U~+l). 
Lemma B. 7. Let ot be such that ~ + _1 < it. Let X be the action string and A the 
action name such that tr(a + 1)=A; A. Let ~ be such that t r (y )=A.  For any 
logically closed set Y of formulas from .Zt(A~), we have 
E~+ I(Y) = E,~+ I(Y n£t(Uv) ). 
PROOF. Follows easily from the fact that every constituent of every rule in Oa+ 1 
belongs to .Z~(Uv)U.Z~(U~+I). []
Lemma B.8. Let at be such that a + 1 < Ix. Let X be the action string and A the 
action name such that tr(ce+ 1)=.x~A. Let y be such that o ' (y )=.~ Let 
Y = Cnj({ ~ Reachable([A-])}). Let S be a state. Let Z = Cnv[{Reachable([.4])} tO 
~(S, A )]. The following hold. 
1. The unique extension of E~ + l(Y) is Cnu~ + ({ --1 Reachable([ A; A ])}). 
2. I rA is prohibited in S, then the unique extension of E~+ l(Z) is 
Cnv~+ ,({ -~ Reachable([ .4; A ])}). 
3. I rA is not prohibited in S, then X is an extension of E~+ I(Z) if and only if there 
is a state S' ~ Res(A, S) such that 
X=Cnv.+~[{Reachable([ .4; A ])} u ~(S ' ,A ;  A)]. 
PROOF. For this lemma we will use the Splitting Set Theorem, with splitting set 
B = { Reachable([ A; A])}. Notice that B splits both E,~+i(Y)and E,+I(Z). 
For the first part, it's not hard to verify that the unique extension of bB(E~+ l(Y)) 
is CnB({-1Reachable([~ A])}). Moreover, it is easy to verify that 
eB(E,~+l(Y),CnB({~Reachable([.zT; A])}) )=Q.  
Thus 
(Cn. ({ Reachable(t X; A 1))), Cn > 
is a solution to E.+ I(Y) with respect o B, and by the Splitting Set Theorem it 
follows that Cnv=+,({ --1Reachable([~ A])) is the unique extension of E~+ I(Y). 
For part two, assume that A is prohibited in S. Thus there is fluent formula ~b 
such that the rule 
Holds( [ A-q) 
-1 Reachable( ,4; A)  
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belongs to D,~+ 1and ~b is satisfied in S. Since ~b is satisfied in S, $ ~ Cnr(S). Thus 
we have Holds(qb,[X])~X(CnF(S),X), and it follows by Lemma B.4 that 
Holds( qb,[A_]) ~ Cnx~v,,T)(~,(S, A )). And since Cnx~r,X)(~(S, A)) c Z, we have 
Holds(ch,[A]) ~ Z. It follows easily that the unique extension of bB(E~+i(Z)) is 
CnB({ ~ Reachable([A; A])}). Again, it is easy to verify that 
eB(E~+ I (Z ) ,CnB({~ Reachable([_~; A ])1)) = Q~. 
Thus, by essentially the same reasoning as in the previous case, we can conclude 
that the unique extension of E~+I(Z) is Cnv,+,({-~ Reachable([ A; A])}). 
For the third part, assume that A is not prohibited in S. Reasoning much as 
before, we see that unique extension of bB(E~+ I(Z)) is Cnn(B). Now take 
D' = eB( E~+ I (Z) ,  CnB( B) ). 
The key step is to recognize that 
D' = £( A( A ,S) ,X ;  A). 
Thus, we can apply Lemma B.2 relating Res(A, S) and A(A, S), as follows. 
(Left-to-right) Assume that X is an extension of E~+ 1(Z). By the Splitting Set 
Corollary, ( X N _9~(B), X Ch .£P(£(F, ~ A))) is a solution to E~,+ I(Z) with respect 
to B, and it follows immediately that X~_9"(B) is a consistent extension of 
bB(E~+i(Z)) and that Xrh .9" (£ (F ,~A) )  is a consistent extension of D'. Let 
X'  = X A _ow(~(F, ~ A)). Notice that X = Cnvo+(B U X'). Since D'  = 
E(A(A,S),  ~ A), we know by Lemmas B.2 and B.5 that there is a state S '~ 
Res(A, S) such that X '  , 7:. = Cn~r,~.A)[S.(S, A A)]. It follows that X = Cn~;+,(B u
X(s', A; A)). 
(Right-to-left) Assume there is a state S' ~ Res(A, S) such that X = Cnvo+,(B U
E(S', A; A)). We know that CnB(B) is a consistent extension of bB(E~+ I(Z)). Let 
X'  ' ~ D'  = Cnr.~v, y; A)[E(S , A, A)]. Since = E(A(A, S), .~ A), we know by Lemmas 
B.2 and B.5 that X '  is a consistent extension of D'. It follows by the Splitting Set 
Theorem that X is an extension of E~+ ~(Z). [] 
At this point we have applied the fundamental lemmas (B.I&B.2) to the parts 
of 6(D) that we obtain using the splitting sequence (A~)~<~,. The resulting 
lemmas (B.6&B.8) capture essential properties of 6(D) in a form that will be 
convenient for our proof of the Correspondence L mma. 
In what follows, we will first show that for any model • of D we can construct a
corresponding extension of 6(D) (Lemma B.14). It will then remain to show that 
each consistent extension of 6(D) corresponds to a unique model of D (Lemma 
B.21). These results together will establish that there is indeed a one-to-one 
correspondence b tween models of D and consistent extensions of 6(D). More- 
over, we will show that each model and its corresponding extension agree on the 
truth of all value propositions, which will suffice to establish the Correspondence 
Lemma. 
At this point we associate with each structure for D a unique set of literals from 
.~(U). It will be our goal to show that, for any model of D, the associated set of 
literals is a consistent extension of 6(D). 
For any structure • for D, let ~(~)  be the least set of literals from ~(U)  such 
that for every action string A: 
1. i f /T~ Dom(~), then -7 Reachable([ A]) ~ 6(~);  and 
2. if A~ Dora(W), then Reachable([A-]) ~ 6(~) and ~,(~(A ), A ) _ 6(qt). 
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In Lemma B.IO below, we will show that 6(~)  has the following crucial 
property: a value proposition V is true in • if and only if [V] ~ Cnv(6(~)).  
Lemma B.9. Let xt, be a structure for D. For all action strings A, we have 
Cnv(,S(']')) n~(Y_,(V, X)):Cn~(v.~)(S('I,') n-~(~(V, R))). 
PROOF. Straightforward. [] 
Lemma B.IO. A value proposition V is true in a structure ~ for D if and only if 
[V] ~ Cnv(~('t')). 
PROOF. Notice that it is sufficient to prove that the lemma holds for all atomic 
value propositions. So consider any value proposition ~b after 
(l_~ft-to-right) Assume that ~b after Ais  true in ~.  Thus, X~ Dorn(~) and ~b is 
satisfied in ~(X) .  Since 4~ is satisfied in ~(X) ,  we know that 4)~ Cnr(qt(X)). 
Thus, Holds(oh,[.4])~ [CnA~(~(X)), X]. We can conclude by Lemma B.4 that 
Holds(oh,[A]) ~ Cn~_('Z(~_(A ), A )). By the definition of 6(~),  Reachable([,A]) 
~(~)  and E(~(A  ), A ) ___ 6(~).  So we've shown that Reachable([ A]) A 
Holds(oh, IX]) ~ Cnv(6(~)).  That is, [4) after A] ~ Cnv(6(~)).  
(Right-to-left) Assume that [~b after A] ~ Cnv(~(~)). That is just to say that 
Reachable([ A]) /~ Holds( qa, [A]) ~ Cnv( 6( v¢ )). Thus Holds(oh, [A]) ~ Cnv( 8( ~_ )) 
and Reachable([ A]) ~ Cnv(8(~)).  By the definition of 6(~),  it follows that A 
Dom(~).  Again by the definition of 6(~),  we can conclude that E (~(A  ), A )= 
6(~)  N-~(E(F, A)). Thus, Cn~(v. A-)(~(~(A ), A )) = Cnx(r, ~-)(6(~) ~ .~(E(F, A))). 
By Lemmas B.4 and B.9 it follows that 
E[CnF(*(Y)), A-] 
And since we know that Holds(~b,[A])~ Cnv(6(~))M.Z~(~(F, A)), it follows that 
Holds(~b,[A]) ~ E[Cnv(~(X)) ,  A]. So ~b ~ Cnv(~(X)) .  That is, ~( .~)  satisfies ~b 
and thus 4~ after .~ is true in ~.  [] 
Now we begin the main part of the proof of the left-to-right direction of the 
Correspondence Lemma. 
Let ~ be a model of D. We will show that Cnv(6(~))  is an extension of 6(D). 
We begin by putting Cnv(6(~))  in a form more suitable for application of the 
Splitting Sequence Theorem. 
Let (X~)~, < ~ be defined as follows. 
1. X o = Cnvo(~(~) n~(U0)) .  
2. For all a such that a + 1 < It, X,+ 1 = Cnu,+(t~(qr) ~.g~(U~+~)). 
3. For all limit ordinals o< < It, X,~ = Cn~ (~). 
Lemma B.11. We have 
PROOF. It is straightforward to verify that 
~S(*) = U (~s(*) n,~(~,)). 
a<:/~ 
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It is clear from the definitions that for all a<ix ,  X,=Cnvo(6(4)n_~(U~)) .  
The lemma follows easily from these observations. [] 
We will show that (X~)~ <,  is a solution to 6(D) with respect o (A~)~ < ~. 
Lemma B.12. Let ce be a nonlimit ordinal such that a < IX. Let Abe  the action string 
such that.~= o'( ~ ). The following hold. 
1. I f  .~ ~ Dom( 4 ) then X~ = Cnuo[{ Reachable([ A])}_u ~,( 4 (  A ), A )]. 
2. I f  X f~ Dom( 4 ) then X~ = Cnv ({ ~ Reachable([A])}). 
PROOF. By the definition of (X~)4 < ~ we know that X~ = Cnu(6(4)  ¢q.Zt(U~)). 
For part one, assume that A eDom(4) .  From the definition of 6 (4)  we can 
conclude that 6 (4)  ¢q2(U~) = {Reachable([.~])} u ~Z(4(A ), A ). For part two, 
assume that X~Dom(4) .  From the definition of 6 (4)  we can conclude 
that 6 (4)  N.Zt(U~) = {-7 Reachable([.~])}. [] 
Lemma B.13. For each o~ such that ~ + 1 < IX, X~+ l is a consistent extension of the 
default heory 
over ~(  U~ + l ). 
PROOF. Let Abe  the action string and A the action name such that o-(c~ + 1)= 
~ A. Let y be such that ~(y)  =A_ By the definition of E~+ 1 we know that 
It is easy to verify that 
Thus, by Lemma B.7 we can conclude that 
So we will show that X~+ 1 is an extension of E~+ ~(Xr). Consider three cases. 
Case 1 . .~  A ~ Dom(4) .  Since the domain of 4 is prefix-closed, ,zTE Dom(4) .  Let 
S = 4(./T) and S' = 4( .~ A). By the previous lemma we have the following 
Xv = Cn u, [ { Reachable([ A--']) } U E( S, A-) ] 
x.+ , = Cnuo+ , [ { Reachable( [ X; A])} u A)]. 
Since A; A ~ Dom(4) ,  we know that A is not prohibited in S. Furthermore, since 
4 is a model of D, we have S' e Res(A, S). Thus, by part three of Lemma B.8, 
X~+ 1 is a consistent extension of E~+I(XT). 
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Case 2. ~ A ~ Dom(W) and tT~ Dom(~). Let S = ~(A) .  In this case, X~ is the 
same as in the previous case. By the previous lemma 
Xa+ 1 = Cnu~+l({ ~ Reachable( [ .d; A ])}). 
Since D is a qualification-free domain, and A_ A ~ Dom(W) while . / l e  Dom(W), 
we can conclude that A is prohibited in S. Thus, by part two of Lemma B.8, X~+ 1 
is a consistent extension of E~+ l(Xv). 
Case 3 . .~ A ~ Dom(W) and X~ Dom(*). In this case, X~+ 1 is the same as in the 
previous case. By the previous lemma 
x,= 
By part 
Cnv~({--n Reachable([ A--])}). 
one of Lemma B.8, X,+ 1 is a consistent extension of E~+ I(X~). [] 
B.14. Let D be a qualification-free domain theory without value propositions. 
is a model olD, then Cnv( 6(xF)) is a consistent extension of 6(D). 
Lemma 
I f .  
PROOF. First, the fact that X 0 is a consistent extension of bAo(6(D)) follows easily 
from Lemma B.6. Second, the previous lemma shows that for each a such that 
a + 1 </~, X~+ 1 is a consistent extension of 
Ux, ). 
Finally, by the definition of (X~)~ < •, we know that for all limit ordinals a </x, 
X~ = Cne(Q). These observations are sufficient to establish that (X~)~ < ~, is a 
solution to 6(D)wi th  respect o (A~)~ < ,. By Lemma B.11 
so we can conclude by the Splitting Sequence Theorem that Cnv(~(~)) is a 
consistent extension of 6(D). [] 
We have essentially established the left-to-right direction of the Correspon- 
dence Lemma. Now we turn our attention to the other direction. 
Let X be a consistent extension of 6(D). We will show that there is a (unique) 
model q~ of D such that X = Cnv(8(qo) (Lemma B.21). To this end, we specify a 
construction that, as we will show, yields a unique model of D for each consistent 
extension of 6(D). 
Let xP x be the partial function from actions strings to sets of fluent literals that 
satisfies the following two conditions: 
1. Dom( qrx ) = {A: Reachable([ l~]) ~ X}. 
2. For all non-limit ordinals a </x, if or(a) ~Dom(Wx) , then Wx(Cr(a)) is the 
greatest set of fluent literals such that x(qtx(er(a)) ,  o'(a))c_Xf~_$a(U~). 
Thus, for every action string A~ Dom(XPx) , qtx(.~) is the greatest set S of 
fluent literals such that ]~(S, t~) is a subset of X. One thing we will show is that 
such sets S are in fact states (Lemma B.17). More generally, we will establish the 
fact that W x is a structure for D such that X= Cnu(6(Wx)) (Lemma B.18). 
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Lemma B. 15. The domain of ~x is nonempty and prefix-closed. 
PROOF. By Lemma B.6 (and the Splitting Sequence Corollary), we can conclude 
that Reachable(S o)~ X. Thus the domain of q~x is nonempty. 
For every action string ~ 6(D) includes the rule 
:Reachable([ A-I) 
Reachable([ A-I) 
from which it follows that for every action string /T, either Reachable([.4])~ X or 
-7 Reachable([ if]) ~ X. Furthermore, for every action string f f  and action name A, 
6(D) includes the rule 
Reachable([ A--I) 
Reachable([ .4; A ]) 
which guarantees that if --1 Reachable([ if]) ~ X then ~ Reachable([ X, A]) ~ X. 
Thus we can conclude that if XDom(~ x) then A; A ~ Dom(~x), which is just to 
say that the domain of ~x is prefix-closed. [] 
Once again we will be looking to apply Lemmas B.6 and B.8. In order to do this, 
we need an appropriate sequence, which is defined next. 
Let (X~}~ < ~, be the sequence such that for every a < Ix, X~ =Xn-9~(U~). We 
know by the Splitting Sequence Corollary that (X~)~ < ~, is a solution to 6(D) with 
respect o ( A~ )~ < ~,. Moreover, it is not hard to verify that 
Lemma B.16. Let a be such that a + 1 < Ix. Let Abe  the action string and A the 
action name such that cr(a + 1) =A; A. 
1. If Reachable([ ff; A]) ~X~+ 1, then there is a state S such that 
Xo~+l =Cnu.+,[{Reachable([ ~,4; A])} U 3',(S, .,4.; A)] .  
2. If Reachable([ A; A]) ~X~+ 1, then 
X~+ 1 = Cnuo+l({ ~ Reachable([.~; A 1)}). 
PROOF. Proof is by induction on o~. Let 3' be such that ~r(y) =A. By the definition 
of E,+ 1 we know that 
It is not difficult to verify that 
Thus, by Lemma B.7 we can conclude that 
"/3_<5 
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So Sa+ 1 is an extension of E,+ I(Xv). Now consider three cases. 
Case 1. y = 0. Thus A= e. By Lemma B.6 there is a state S such that 
Xv = Cnu~ [ {Reachable([ A-I)} U E (S , /T ) ] .  
To show part one for this case, assume that Reachable([ff; A]) ~ X~+ 1- By part two 
of Lemma B.8 we can conclude that A is not prohibited in S and the desired 
conclusion then follows from part three of Lemma B.8. Part two for this case can 
be proved similarly. 
Case 2. y ~ 0 and Reachable([ A]) E Xv. In this case we use the inductive hypothe- 
sis, which guarantees that there is a state S such that 
Xv= Cnu~[{Reachable([ i f])} U ~(S ,  f f ) ] .  
From this point the proof proceeds as in the previous case. 
Case 3. y ~ 0 and Reachable([ff])~ Xr. In this case we again use the inductive 
hypothesis, which guarantees that Xr = Cnu({-1 Reachable([ff])}). We reach the 
desired conclusion by applying part one of Lemma B.8. [] 
Lemma B.17. ~x is a partial function from action strings to states. 
PROOF. We show that for all non-limit ordinals a </~, if o ' (a )~ Dom(~x), then 
• x(Cr(a)) is a state. First, if a = 0, we can conclude by Lemma B.6 (and the 
Splitting Sequence Corollary), along with the definition of ~x,  that o - (a )~ 
Dom(~ x) and that ~x(O-(a)) is a state. Let a be such that a+l<t~.  If 
( r (a  + 1) ~ Dom(~ x), then Reachable([ or(a + 1)]) ~ X~ + 1, and we can conclude by 
the previous lemma that ~x(~r(a + 1)) is a state. [] 
Lemma B.18. ~x is a structure for D such that X = Cnv( 6(~x)). 
PROOF. By Lemma B.15 and the previous lemma, ~x is partial function from 
action strings to states whose domain is nonempty and prefix-closed, which shows 
that ~x  is a structure for D. Thus, 6(~x) is defined. We must show that 
X = Cnv(6(~x)). To begin, it is easy to verify that 
Cnv(6(*x)  ) =Cnv( ~< Cnuo(6(*x) n~(U~)) ) .  
Recall that 
Given these observations, we see that it will be sufficient o show that for every 
a < I.L, X~ = Cnu(6(@ x) n.~(U,~)). 
If o~ is a limit ordinal, this is trivially true; so assume that a is a nonlimit 
ordinal and let f f  be the action string such that i f=  o-(a). Now consider two 
cases. 
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Case 1. X~ Dom(~x). In this case, by the definition of 6, we have 6(~x) ~ _~(U~) 
= {~Reachable([A])}. Similarly, by the definition of ~x, we know that 
Reachable([.~]) ~X~. It follows by Lemma B.6 that o~ 4= 0. Thus, by part two of 
Lemma B.16 we can conclude that X~ = Cnv(6(~ x) ~_~(U~)). 
Case 2. X~Dom(~x).  By the definition of ~x, we have Reachable([A])~X~. 
Now, if A = E we know by Lemma B.6 that there is a state S such that 
X= = Cnv~((Reachable([ A--I)) U E( S,/T)). 
On the other hand, if ,4# e, the same thing follows from part one of I_emma B.16. 
By the definition of ~x we know that E(Xttx(A ), A ) __X~. Since X~ is consistent, 
we can conclude that ~x(X)  = S. It follows by the definition of 8 that 
B(~x) N _~(U s) = {Reachable([ A--I) } U E( S, Y) .  
Thus X~ = Cnu~,($(~ x) N..~(U~)). [] 
Now that we know ~x is a structure for D, we'll need just two more lemmas in 
order to establish that ~x is in fact a model for D (Lemma B.21). 
Lemma B.19. For all X~ Dom(~ x) and all action names A, if Res(A, ~x(.4)) is 
nonempty, then A; .4 ~ Dom( ~x ). 
PROOF. Let S = ~x(X). By I_emma B.17, S is a state. Let o~ and Y be such that 
o-(ot + 1) =A; A and tr(3,) =A. By the construction of ~x from X, we know that 
E(S, A)___Xr, and also that Reachable([A])~X~. If 3, = 0 it follows that Lemma 
B.6 that 
X~ = Cn u~ [{ Reachable([ A--I) } U E( S, A)  ] 
since X~ is consistent. On the other hand, if 3, ~ 0, the same thing follows from 
part one of Lemma B.16. Since Res(A, S) is nonempty, we know that A is not 
prohibited in S. It follows by part three of Lemma B.8 that Reachable([ A; A]) 
X~+ 1- Thus, by the construction of ~x from X, ~, A ~ Dom(~ x). [] 
Lemma B.20. For all ~, A ~ Dom( ~x ), ~x( X, A) ~ Res( A, ~x(.4 )). 
PROOF. By__ I_emma B.15, X~Dom(~x),  since ~ A is. Let S =~x(X)  and 
S' =~x(A;A).  Let a and 3' be such that o-(a+ 1)=A_ A and o-(3,)=~ By 
Lemma B.17, S and S' are states. By essentially the same reasoning used in the 
proof of the previous lemma, we can show each of the following. 
Xv= Cnu~ [ {Reachable([ A--])} U ~(S,/T)] 
S~+ 1 = Cnu=+,[{Reachable([ A; A ])} U ~(S' ,  A; A)] 
It follows from part two of Lemma B.8 that A is not prohibited in S. We can 
conclude by part three of Lemma B.8 that S' ~ Res(A, S). That is, ~x(~ A) 
Res(A,~x(X)). [] 
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Lemma B.21. Let D be a qualification-free domain theory without value propositions. 
I f  X is a consistent extension of 6(D), then xIt x is a (unique) model o lD such that 
X = Cnu(~(~x)). 
PROOV. By Lemma B.18, ~x is a structure for D such that X= Cnv(8('Itx)). 
Moreover, it is clear that ~x is the only such structure. Lemma B.17 shows that 
'~'x(e) is a state. Given this, Lemmas B.19 and B.20 establish the fact that ~I' x is a 
model of D. [] 
Lemma B.22. (Correspondence L mma). Let D be a qualification-free ~¢~ domain 
description without value propositions. There is a one-to-one correspondence b - 
tween models o lD and consistent extensions of 6(D) such that a value proposition 
V is true in a model o lD if and only if the formula [V] belongs to the corresponding 
extension of 6( D ). 
PROOF. We have defined a total function from models • of D to consistent 
extensions Cnv(6(~)) of 6(D) (Lemma B.14). Notice that this function is injec- 
tive. To see that it is also surjective, notice that we have also defined a total 
function from consistent extensions X of 6(D) to models ~x of D such that 
X= Cnv(6(~x)) (Lemma B.21). Thus 6 can be used to define a one-to-one 
correspondence b tween models of D and consistent extensions of 6(D). Finally, 
we've shown that a value proposition V is true in a model • of D if and only if the 
formula IV] belongs to the corresponding extension Cnv(6(~)) of 6(D) (Lemma 
B.10). [] 
We require one more lemma for the proof of the Correspondence Theorem. 
Lemma B.23. Let D be a qualification-free domain description. Let D' be the domain 
description obtained by deleting all value propositions from D. Let E be a consistent 
set of formulas from 5g~(U). E = Cnu( 6( D ) e) if and only irE = Cnu( 6( D') e) and 
for every value proposition V ~ D, IV] ~ E. 
PROOV. (l_~ft-to-right) Assume that E=Cnu(6(D)E) .  It is clear that E= 
4, 
Cnu(6(D')E), since every rule in 6(D) \6 (D ' )  has the form Fals-----e" By the 
Correspondence Lemma, there is a model • of D'  such that for every value 
proposition V, V is true in qt if and only if [ V ] ~ E. Consider any value proposition 
V~D.  Since ~ ~ 6(D), we know that -~[V] ~E.  It follows that -1V is not 
true in ~,  and thus that V is true in ~. So we can conclude that [V] ~E.  
Proof in the other direction is similar, but slightly simpler. [] 
PROOF OF CORRESPONDENCE THEOREM. Let D be a qualification-free domain 
description. Let D'  be the domain description obtained by deleting all value 
propositions from D. By the Correspondence Lemma, we know that there is a 
one-to-one correspondence between models of D'  and consistent extensions of 
6(D') such that a value proposition V is true in a model of D'  if and only if the 
formula [V] belongs to the corresponding extension of ~(D'). 
Let C be the set of pairs (~,E}  such that • is a model of D'  and E is the 
corresponding extension of 6(D'). Since every model of D is a model of D'  and 
similarly every consistent extension of 6(D) is a consistent extension of 6(D'),  we 
can complete our proof by showing that, for each pair {'I~, E )  that belongs to C, • 
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is a model of D if and only if E is a consistent extension of 6(D). So consider any 
(~,E)~C.  
(Left-to-right) Assume that ~ is a model of D. We can conclude by the 
Correspondence L mma that for every value proposition V~ D, [V] ~ E. Since E 
is a consistent extension of 6(D'),  it follows by the previous lemma that E is a 
consistent extension of 6(D). 
(Right-to-left) Assume that E is a consistent extension of 6(D). It follows by 
the previous lemma that E is a consistent extension of 6(D')  such that for every 
value proposition V ~ D, [V] ~ E. We can conclude by the Correspondence L mma 
that • is a model of D'  that satisfies every value proposition in D. That is, • is a 
model of D. [] 
PROOF OF REACHABILITY COROLLARY. Let A be the set of all Reachable atoms in 
U. Since D includes no executability propositions, A is a splitting set for 6(D). 
Furthermore, it is clear that CnA(A) is the unique extension of bA(6(D)). Notice 
that 
6'( D) = eA( 8( D), CnA( A) ). 
It follows by the Splitting Set Theorem that there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between the consistent extensions of 6(D) and the consistent extensions of 6 ' (D)  
such that for every value propositions V, [V] belongs to a consistent extension of 
6(D) if and only if EV] belongs to the corresponding extension of 6'(D). Given 
this fact, the corollary follows immediately from the Correspondence Theorem. 
[] 
B.2. Proof of  LP  Correspondence Theorem, LP  Reachability Corollary, 
and Vivid Domains Theorem 
Proof of the LP Correspondence Theorem is based on the following lemma, which 
is shown to follow from the Correspondence Theorem for default logic. 
Lemma B.24 (LP Correspondence Lemma). Let D be a simple, qualification-free 
s~ domain description without value propositions. There is a one-to-one correspon- 
dence between models of D and consistent answer sets of cr( D ) such that, for every 
model xlt of D and corresponding answer set X, a simple value proposition 
V 1 V . . .  V Vrn V ~ V m + 1 V . . .  V ~ V n is true in • if and only if at least one of the 
sets {~ V1 ] ... . .  E Vm ]} n X and {E Vm + 1 ], " " , E Vn ]} \ X is nonempty. 
PROOF. To begin, because D includes no value propositions, it is straightforward 
to determine that the default theories dt(Tr(D)) and 6(D) have precisely the same 
extensions. By the Correspondence Theorem, we know there is a one-to-one 
correspondence b tween models of D and consistent extensions of 6(D) such that, 
for every model ~ of D and corresponding extension E, a value proposition V is 
true in ~ if and only if [V] E E. Let C be the set of pairs (~,  E )  such that • is a 
model of D and E is the corresponding consistent extension of 6(D). Since 6(D) 
and dt(zr(D)) have the same extensions, we know that the set {E n Lit(U): E is a 
consistent extension of 6(D)} is precisely the set of consistent answer sets for 
zr(D). Take A ={(~,E  AL i t (U) ) : (~,E)  ~C}. 
Consider any (~,  E )  ~ C, along with the corresponding pair (~ ,  X )  ~ A. It is 
clear from the construction of zr(D) that for any simple atomic value proposition 
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L after ~ EL after /t~ ~X if and only if both EL after X~X and 
Reachab le ( [A] )  ~X.  We can conclude that EL after X~ ~X if and only if [L after 
A]  ~ E. It follows by the Correspondence Theorem that for any simple atomic 
value proposition V, V is true in • if and only if ~V} ~X.  
Assume that (~,  X )  and (q~', X ' )  are distinct members of A. It follows that 
and ~ '  are distinct, and so must differ on the truth of some simple atomic value 
proposition V. We can conclude that exactly one of the two sets X, X '  includes 
EV~. Thus X-~X' .  This shows that A captures a one-to-one correspondence 
between models of D and consistent answer sets of it(D). 
Now consider any simple value proposition V = V 1 v ... v V m v ~ V m + 1 v .. .  v 
-~ V n and any (~,  X )  ~ A. We know that V is true in • if and only if at least one 
of V 1 . . . . .  V m is true in ~ or at least one of V m+l . . . . .  Vn is not true in ~.  Since 
each of V 1 . . . . .  V m is a simple atomic value proposition, we can conclude that at 
least one of V1,. . . ,V m is true in • if and only if {~VI~ . . . . .  ~Vm}} f~X is nonempty. 
Similarly, since each of V m + 1 . . . . .  V~ is a simple atomic value proposition, we can 
conclude that at least one of 1,1,,+ 1. . . . .  V, is not true in • iff {~V m + 1} . . . . .  ~V~} \X  
is nonempty. Summing up, we have shown that V 1 v ... v V m v -~ V m + 1 v .. .  v ~ Is, 
is true in ~ iff at least one of the sets {EV 1 ~ . . . . .  ~V,,~} n X and {~V m + a~ . . . . .  EVn~} \X  
is nonempty. [] 
PROOF OF LP CORRESPONDENCE THEOREM. Let D be a simple, qualification-free 
domain description. Let D '  be the domain description obtained from D by 
deleting all value propositions. By the LP Correspondence Lemma, we know that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence b tween models of D '  and consistent answer 
sets of ~-(D') such that, for every model • of D '  and corresponding answer set X, 
a simple value proposition VI v ... v V m v ~ V m + ~ v . . .  v ~ V~ is true in xt r if and 
only if either {[VI~ . . . .  ,EVm~} nX=/= Q or {EVm+ 1] . . . . .  EV~}}\X~ 0 .  
Notice that ~- (D) \  7r(D') consists of all rules of the form 
Fa lse  ~ ~Vm+ 1~, " ' ,  ~V~), not l IV l )  . . . . .  no t~Vm~,  
where V 1 v -.. v Vm V ~ Vm + 1 V "'" V ~ V~ is a (simple) value proposition in D. It 
is a consequence of this observation that, for any set X, X is an answer set for 
~-(D) if and only if X is an answer set for ~r(D') such that, for every value 
proposition V 1 V - - -V  V m V ---1 Vm+ 1 V "'" V ~ V n in D, either {EV1~ . . . . .  [Vm)} n 
X :~ Q or {IV m + 1~ . . . . .  ~V,)} \X  ~ Q. We will rely on this result below. 
Let A be the set of pairs (qr, X )  such that xI r is a model of D '  and X is the 
corresponding answer set for ~-(D'). Since every model of D is a model of D '  and 
similarly every consistent answer set for ~-(D) is a consistent answer set for zr(D'), 
we can complete our proof by showing that, for each pair (xI r, X )  that belongs to 
A, xt r is a model of D if and only if X is a consistent answer set for zr(D). So 
consider any (qr, X )  ~ A. 
(Left-to-right) Assume that • is a model of D. Thus, every value proposition in 
D is true in qr. It follows by the LP Correspondence Lemma that for every value 
proposition V 1 V - - -V  V m V ~ Vm+ 1 V "'" V -a V n in D, either {~VI~ . . . . .  ~Vm~ } n 
XCQ or {EVm+~] . . . .  ,~V, ]} \X#:~.  We can conclude that X is an answer set 
for ~(D).  
Proof in the other direction is similar. [] 
Next we sketch a proof of the LP Reachability Corollary. A complete proof 
would use the Splitting Set Theorem for logic programs [LT94]. 
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PROOF OF LP REACHABILITY COROLLARY (Sketch). Let B = {Reachable([,4]):A is 
an action string}. Since D is qualification-free, we can show that for every 
consistent answer set X for cr(D), X n Lit(B)= B. Given this, show that for any 
subset X of Lit(U\B), X u B is a consistent answer set for ~(D)  if and only if X 
is a consistent answer set for cr'(D). Finally, since every action string .4belongs to 
Dom(~), we know that for every simple atomic value proposition V, V is true in 
if and only if --1 V is not true in ~.  We can conclude that {EV1] . . . . .  ~Vtn~,~'~-   . . . . .  
N X ~ Q if and only if either {EVil . . . .  , EV,.]} n X ~ 0 or  {~V m + 1~ . . . . .  ~Vn) } \X  
~Q.  [] 
Finally we begin the proof of the Vivid Domains Theorem. 
For any domain description D, let 
Rules(D)=(~:4,suff icesfor~O~D}. 
We will need the following lemma. 
Lemma B.25. (Vivid Domains Lemma). Let D be a vivid ~ domain description. 
For any set X of fluent literals, 
Cn( X U Rules(D)) = Cn( X U Rules( Simple(D))). 
PROOF. It is easy to verify that for any set X of fluent formulas we have 
Cn ( X U Rules( Simple(D))  c_ Cn ( X U Rules(D)). 
For the other direction, let X be a set of fluent literals, and take 
Y = Cn( X u Rules( Simple(D) ) ). 
We will show that Y is closed under X u Rules(D). We begin by observing that 
because X is a set of fluent literals and every rule in Rules(Simple(D)) has either 
4, 4, 
the form ~ where L is a fluent literal or the form F---~se ' we can conclude that 
there is a set Y' of fluent literals such that Y = Cn(Y'). It's clear that Y is closed 
under X, so consider any rule 4, 
- -  ~ Rules(D) such that 4, ~ Y. We must show that 
~0 
~0 also belongs to Y. Since 4, ~ Y and Y = Cn(Y') for some set Y' of fluent literals, 
we can conclude that some disjunct 4,' of DNF(4,) belongs to Y. Since 4, suffices 
for tO is vivid, we know that ~b is either a nonempty conjunction of fluent literals or 
the formula False. If ~0 is False, then Y is inconsistent and we're done; so assume 
that tO is a nonempty conjunction of fluent literals. Consider any conjunct L of ~0. 
The rule 4,' suffices for L belongs to Simple(D), and since 4,' ~ Y, we have L E Y. 
We can conclude that each conjunct of ~b belongs to Y; and since Y is logically 
closed, we have ~b ~ Y. [] 
Notice that the preceding lemma establishes the fact that domain descriptions 
D and Simple(D) have the same set of states. 
PROOF OF VIVID DOMAIN THEOREM. We have already observed that, for any 
structure ~,  all of the value propositions in D are true in • if and only all of the 
value propositions in Simple(D) are true in ~.  By the Vivid Domains Lemma, we 
know that domains D and Simple(D) have the same set of states. Consider any 
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action A and state S. We complete the first part of the proof by showing that a 
state S' may result from doing A in S in domain D if and only if S' may result 
from doing A in S in domain Simple(D). 
It is easy to verify that A is prohibited in S in domain D if and only if A is 
prohibited in S in domain Simple(D). If A is prohibited in S in the two domains, 
we're done. So assume otherwise. It is also easy to see that the two domains agree 
on the set F(A,S). Furthermore, although the two domains may not agree 
precisely on the set E(A, S), it is clear that they do agree on Cn(E(A,S)). It 
follows that E '  is an explicit effect of A in S in domain Simple(D) if and only if 
there is an explicit effect E of A in S in domain D such that E '  = Cn(E) n Lit(F). 
Moreover, for any such E and E ' ,  it is clear that, for any set F of inference rules, 
Cn(F u E) = Cn(F U E'). 
(Left-to-right) Assume that S' may result from doing A in S in domain D. So 
there is an explicit effect E of A in S in domain D such that 
= Cn[(S n S' n Lit(F$)) u E u Rules( D)]. Cn( S') 
We have already observed that there must be an explicit effect E '  of A in S in 
domain Simple(D) such that E '  = Cn(E) n Lit(F) and, for any set F of inference 
rules, Cn(F U E) = Cn(F u E'). Thus 
Cn( S') = Cn[ ( S AS'  n Lit(Ff ) ) w E' u Rules(D)]. 
Furthermore, because (S n S 'N  Lit(Ff))U E' is a set of fluent literals, we can 
conclude by the Vivid Domains Lemma that 
Cn( S') = Cn[ ( S n S' n Lit(Ff ) ) u E' u Rules( Simple( D ) ) ] . 
That is, S' may result from doing A in S in domain Simple(D). 
Proof in the other direction is similar. Thus we have shown that the two domains 
agree on Res, which is sufficient to establish the fact that they have the same 
models, given the earlier observation that they have equivalent sets of value 
propositions (Section 6). Moreover, since they also agree, for each action A and 
state S, on the question of whether or not A is prohibited in S, we can conclude 
that either both domain descriptions are qualification-free or neither is. [] 
Many thanks to Vladimir Lifschitz and Norman McCain. Thanks also to Chitta Baral, Michael Gelfond, 
Enrico Giunchiglia, G. Neelakantan Kartha, Teodor Przymusinski and Michael Thielscher for helpful 
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